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Ending Jim Crow Life Insurance Rates
Mary L. Heen*
How people count and measure embodies certain assumptions about the
thing they are counting; this was true in the nineteenth century, and it is
equally true today.1
[E]ver since the 1880’s, Negroes have been subject to differential
treatment by white insurance companies in that some of them, at that time,
started to apply higher premium schedules for Negro than for white
customers, whereas others decided not to take on any Negro business at
all. The underlying reason, of course, is the fact that mortality rates are
much higher for Negroes than for whites.2
[I]f the misery of our poor be caused not by the laws of nature, but by our
institutions, great is our sin.3
I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

Earlier this decade some of America’s best-known life insurance companies
quietly settled multi-million dollar civil rights lawsuits involving race-based life
insurance rates and benefits.4 As a result, those companies closed a chapter of American
*

Visiting Professor, Spring 2009, Washington and Lee University School of Law, and Professor of Law at
the University of Richmond. I am grateful for financial support for this project from the University of
Richmond’s Hunton & Williams Summer Research Endowment Fund. My thanks to reference librarians at
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Osborne at Washington and Lee University for their assistance in locating additional research materials. I
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1
PATRICIA CLINE COHEN, A CALCULATING PEOPLE: THE SPREAD OF NUMERACY IN EARLY AMERICA 211
(1982) (emphasis omitted).
2
GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY 316
(1944).
3
CHARLES DARWIN, THE VOYAGE OF THE BEAGLE 526 (2d ed., P F Collier & Son 1909) (1839).
4
E.g., Thompson v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 149 F. Supp. 2d 38 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (denying defendant’s motion
for summary judgment); MetLife Is Settling Bias Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2002, at C12 (describing
settlement of a lawsuit under state and federal civil rights law challenging race-based underwriting
practices of the company from 1901 to 1972 and reporting that $250 million for associated litigation and
regulatory costs had been set aside previously as a charge against earnings); see $1 Million Donated to
Settle Bias Lawsuit, HARTFORD COURANT, Dec. 21, 2002, at E2 (reporting that Prudential had donated
$500,000 apiece to the United Negro College Fund and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund in addition to
payments to individual policyholders as part of a settlement of a lawsuit accusing it of using race-based
insurance rates); Joseph B. Treaster, Insurer Agrees It Overcharged Black Clients, N.Y. TIMES, June 22,
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economic history that began after the Civil War with door-to-door marketing of small
individual life insurance policies to protect poor workers and their families from the
indignity of a pauper’s burial.5 The closing of this chapter in history also marked the end
of a form of Jim Crow race discrimination largely invisible to the American public.
Although the settlements provided partial recompense to black Americans harmed
by the continuing effects of policies sold during the Jim Crow era, the litigation itself did
not accomplish a broader shift in commercial practice. Litigation brought under Civil
War-era civil rights statutes6 primarily served as a “mop-up” operation following the
industry’s elimination of race-based practices for most new policies issued after the
beginning of the modern civil rights era. Under pressure from civil rights advocates, for
example, the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company eliminated explicit race-based rates
for some new policies as early as 1948.7 By the early 1960s, industry professional
organizations had developed and approved race-integrated mortality tables as an industrywide standard.8 Thus, by the time the Civil Rights Movement had accomplished
landmark legal and legislative changes in education, public accommodations,
employment, housing, and voting rights, the biggest players in the life insurance industry
had “voluntarily” discontinued their most visible race-based practices for newly issued
policies.9
This Article traces the evolution of explicit race-based insurance practices over a
century as the American life insurance industry responded to changes in the social,
economic, and legal status of former slaves. It illustrates and illuminates the complex
interaction between civil rights reform and private commercial practice. The story told
here, drawn from insurance company and economic histories, NAACP Legal Defense
Fund archives, and recently revealed details from state insurance department
2000, at A1 (reporting that American General had agreed to make restitution of $206 million, mainly to
black policyholders in five Southern states and their heirs, who as recently as earlier that year had paid up
to a third more than white customers for small life insurance policies). Earlier this year, the John Hancock
Life Insurance Company agreed to a $24.4 million settlement in a class-action lawsuit which alleged that
John Hancock racially discriminated in the sale of life insurance policies before 1959 by offering lowergrade policies to African Americans. Donna Goodison, Hancock Settles Bias Suit, BOSTON HERALD, April
8, 2009, at 27 (reporting on the settlement of Norflet v. John Hancock Fin. Services, Inc. and John Hancock
Life Ins. Co., No. 04-1099 (D. Conn. Jan. 29, 2007)).
5
That market declined in importance for many major life insurance companies as living standards
improved and the employer-based group insurance market expanded throughout the twentieth century.
E.g., JENNIFER KLEIN, FOR ALL THESE RIGHTS: BUSINESS, LABOR, AND THE SHAPING OF AMERICA’S
PUBLIC-PRIVATE WELFARE STATE 16–52 (2003).
6
Lawsuits challenging race discrimination in life insurance rates and benefits have included claims under
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which prohibits race discrimination in the making or enforcement of
contracts. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982
(2006)). The Act’s purpose was to “giv[e] real content to the freedom guaranteed by the Thirteenth
Amendment.” Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, Co., 392 U.S. 409, 433 (1968) (recounting the legislative history
leading to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and 42 U.S.C. § 1982); see also Runyan v. McCrary,
427 U.S. 160, 170 (1976) (relying on same history with regard to purpose of 42 U.S.C. § 1981).
7
See discussion infra Part III.B.4, III.D.
8
See discussion infra Part III.B.4.
9
See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, SURVEY OF LIFE INSURERS RESULTS (Sept. 16, 1988) (reporting
results of survey, in which 52 of the responding 2753 life insurance companies reported having ever used
race-based premiums, with a majority of those companies reporting that they had discontinued issuing
policies with race-based premiums prior to 1964 or 1965, and all but one of the rest reporting
discontinuance by 1987; 22 reported that they were currently collecting race-based premiums for
previously issued policies).
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investigations and civil rights litigation, both affirms and challenges patterns of reform
observed by legal historians outside of the private commercial context.
Studies of the development and interpretation of constitutional law have shown
that civil rights reforms can provoke backlash that transforms former status hierarchies
into more modern or private forms of discrimination.10 Recognition of the basic civil
rights of free blacks at the end of the Civil War and during the short-lived Reconstruction
era was soon followed, for example, by a reformulation of the legal status of former
slaves.11 After ratification of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution, the Supreme Court distinguished between political rights
of citizenship and private associational affinities, ushering in the Jim Crow era of statesanctioned social and economic segregation that persisted until the mid-twentieth
century.12 As observed by legal historian Reva Siegel in another context, “civil rights
reform does not simply abolish a status regime” but “in important respects, it modernizes
the rules and rhetoric” used to justify and enforce the former status hierarchy.13
When careful attention is paid to how race-based insurance pricing practices
developed, an analogous privately imposed transformation can be discerned here: Private
life insurance companies translated former race hierarchies into race-based mortality risk
classifications. During a period of racial retrenchment, after free blacks had challenged
formerly settled political, social, and legal understandings, private companies
reformulated contested status regimes into actuarial risk categories that quantified
differences between blacks and whites.14 Mortality rate differentials led to coverage
restrictions and to a dual race-based pricing structure in low-income markets for life
insurance.15
The century-long effort to outlaw race-based pricing practices in the insurance
industry illuminates the challenges faced by those who sought reform of this
“modernized” private commercial practice. During the Jim Crow era, life insurance
companies doing business in newly emerging markets began categorizing blacks as
“substandard” mortality risks.16 Adopted after the rise of scientific racism17 and
10

E.g., MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 344–442 (2004); Jack M. Balkin, What Brown Teaches Us About
Constitutional Theory, 90 VA. L. REV. 1537, 1559–60 (2004); Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk:
Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 1470 (2004).
11
See discussion infra Part III.A and notes 91–92.
12
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544, 551 (1896); see also discussion infra Part III.A.
13
Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L. J. 2117,
2179 (1996) (providing a case study of domestic assault law as it evolved from a law of marital prerogative
to a law of marital privacy).
14
See discussion infra Parts III.B.1, III.B.3 (discussing race-based policies adopted beginning in the 1880s
by Prudential and by Metropolitan Life, and the rationalization of these policies in an influential study of
“race traits” published by Prudential’s actuary at the end of the nineteenth century).
15
See discussion of race-based practices in industrial insurance markets infra in Part III.B.
16
See discussion infra Part III.B.
17
See, e.g., STEVEN JAY GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 30–72 (1981) (discussing pre-evolutionary
styles of scientific racism and the influence of Samuel’s Morton’s measurement by race of cranial capacity
of skulls in the antebellum period and reporting contrary results when repeating Morton’s measuring
experiments); see also BRUCE DAIN, A HIDEOUS MONSTER OF THE MIND: AMERICAN RACE THEORY IN THE
EARLY REPUBLIC 227–63 (2002) (discussing the development of race theory from the American Revolution
to the Civil War); AUDREY SMEDLEY, RACE IN NORTH AMERICA: ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF A
WORLDVIEW 231–54 (1993) (discussing nineteenth century scientific contributions to ideologies about race
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rationalized during the ascendancy of the eugenics movement,18 these race-based
practices became firmly entrenched in the life insurance industry.
Legal responses to race-based life insurance practices first appeared in the 1880s,
when states began enacting civil rights laws to prohibit race discrimination in insurance.
In 1884, for example, Massachusetts explicitly prohibited race-based rates or premiums
for life insurance policies; several other northern states had adopted similar laws by the
end of the nineteenth century.19 Major life insurance companies generally resisted
legislative efforts to ban discrimination by withdrawing business from those states, by
instructing their agents not to solicit black business, or by adopting other less visible
race-based practices.20 The resulting segregation and segmentation of life insurance
markets lasted well into the modern civil rights era.21
Race-based pricing classifications and coverage restrictions proved difficult to
dislodge not only because of the structure and legal regulation of private commercial
insurance markets,22 but also because of the strength of the underlying ideologies of
racial difference, race separation, and the rhetorical power of actuarial language.
Legislation and litigation, despite some progress, proved ineffective in changing industry
practice.23
By the mid-twentieth century, the assumptions of scientific racism and the
eugenics movement, which had been under attack by public intellectuals in America and
Great Britain since the 1930s and 1940s,24 were finally disavowed.25 The shift in
differences as natural and inborn, and noting the influence of the Types of Mankind, a popular book on
racial inequality published in 1854 that had ten editions before the end of the century); see generally
THOMAS F. GOSSETT, RACE: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA IN AMERICA (1963); WILLIAM STANTON, THE
LEOPARD’S SPOTS: SCIENTIFIC ATTITUDES TOWARD RACE IN AMERICA, 1815–1859 (1960).
18
E.g., ELAZAR BARKAN, THE RETREAT OF SCIENTIFIC RACISM: CHANGING CONCEPTS OF RACE IN BRITAIN
AND THE UNITED STATES BETWEEN THE WORLD WARS 4 (1992). The Supreme Court upheld the Virginia
legislature’s eugenics-inspired 1924 compulsory sterilization act in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927),
which permitted the involuntary sexual sterilization of Carrie Buck and her family, inmates of the Virginia
Colony for Epileptics and Feeble Minded. See also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating
Virginia’s Racial Integrity Act of 1924, an anti-miscegenation law, which required registration of race at
birth and criminalized marriage between white and non-white persons); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184 (1964) (overturning Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883), which upheld Alabama’s antimiscegenation law and criminal prosecution of a cohabiting unmarried black man and white woman).
19
See discussion of state anti-discrimination laws infra Part III.B.2.
20
See discussion infra Parts III.B.2, III.D.
21
See discussion infra Parts II, III (including the development of black-owned and operated fraternal
benefit societies and insurance companies).
22
The life insurance industry has long been regulated by the states and has historically objected to proposed
federal intrusions into regulation of the business of insurance. HOWELL E. JACKSON & EDWARD L.
SYMONS, JR., REGULATION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 442 (1999). For a brief period in the midnineteenth century, leading figures in the insurance industry favored federal regulation when compliance
with state regulations became more burdensome. According to a leading historian of the insurance
business, the movement for federal regulation of insurance failed, however, for three main reasons: 1) it
was opposed by an influential state regulator, New York’s Commissioner of Insurance; 2) in the late 1860s,
the Supreme Court ruled in Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168 (1868), that an insurance policy was not a
transaction in commerce; and 3) the organization of state insurance commissioners into the National
Convention of Insurance Commissioners in 1871 provided a mechanism for more uniform state regulation.
See 1 R. CARLYLE BULEY, THE AMERICAN LIFE CONVENTION 1906–1952, at 83–84 (1953).
23
See discussion infra Parts III.B.2, III.D.
24
See discussion infra Part III.E (discussing the events leading to the rejection of scientific racism).
25
BARKAN, supra note 18, at 279–340; see also, e.g., KLARMAN, supra note 10, at 113 (noting that among
the intellectual elite, “the ideology of white supremacy had been thoroughly undermined by 1940,” and that
“the groundwork had been laid for a fundamental rethinking of racial differences”).
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commercial life insurance race-based practices began soon after the military defeat of the
Nazi regime in World War II and the post-war exposure of the horrors of the regime’s
“Final Solution.”26
After World War II, the struggle for civil rights gained momentum. Unlike civil
rights reform in education, employment, housing, and public accommodations, however,
the adoption of racially-integrated mortality tables by the insurance industry and the
prospective elimination of explicit race-based pricing by the major companies did not, for
the most part, require court orders or the enactment of new federal civil rights
legislation.27
Instead, civil rights advocates and black customers pressured white insurance
companies to change their race-based practices.28 Commercial practice gradually
changed after World War II, as noted above, beginning with the equalization of racebased rates and benefits by a leading company in 1948. Just over a decade later, the
industry and its regulators developed and adopted race-merged mortality tables.29
Although significant mortality differentials remained between racially classified groups
in the late 1940s and throughout the 1950s, improvements in mortality for both black and
white Americans gave companies the maneuvering room to equalize rates and benefits as
part of overall rate reductions for all policyholders.30
The thesis of this Article is that the industry professionals who reformed industry
practice during the modern civil rights era acted in light of a fundamental shift in social
and scientific understandings of race. With the repudiation of biological views of race
following World War II, and with the growing political momentum of civil rights, the
industry could no longer ignore the role played by racism in creating the social and
environmental conditions that disadvantaged blacks. Evidence suggests that the
discontinuation of explicit race-based pricing classifications by the major players in the
private insurance industry resulted in large part from a combination of the transformative
event of World War II, the growing influence of the Civil Rights Movement, and postwar marketplace changes. Civil rights legislation adopted during the second
Reconstruction of the mid-twentieth century and the broadening social and political
movement for civil rights undoubtedly reinforced the need to modify practices for
existing and newly issued insurance policies. However, industry norms were already
largely reformed by the time litigators sought relief for those still covered by the
discriminatory policies of the Jim Crow era.
My inquiry in this Article centers on the development and evolution of race-based
insurance classifications and not on whether these actuarial classifications represented an
accurate generalization of statistical groupings.31 For purposes of this discussion, I’ll
assume that mortality differences exist to a greater or lesser extent among groups

26

See discussion infra in Part III.E.
See discussion infra Part III.
28
See discussion infra Part III.B.4, III.D.
29
See discussion infra Part III.B.
30
See discussion infra Part III.B.
31
Although this Article does not focus on the development of actuarial statistics or the use of race
distinctions in mortality studies more generally, mortality studies or standard tables utilized by the life
insurance industry are referenced throughout the article in relationship to the history of the industry’s
pricing practices.
27
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classified by race, sex, national origin, or even religion.32 These differences depend upon
whether one looks at mortality statistics for the population as a whole or for those who
apply for insurance coverage or some other category, such as urban or rural location, state
of residence,33 occupational group, or time in history.
¶14
Researchers have long debated the reasons for classification-based mortality
differences, but by the second half of the twentieth century, most tended to agree that the
magnitude of each factor changes over time and that these group-defined differences are
largely explained by environmental, social, and behavioral factors.34 Whether disparate
rates or benefits for individuals based on actuarial differences between groups classified
by race, sex, religion, or national origin ought to be permitted requires resolution of
conflicting efficiency and fairness concerns.35
¶15
Over a period of nearly a century, national civil rights policy eventually
discredited explicit race-based pricing of life insurance despite continuing mortality
differences when policyholders were grouped by race.36 Gender-based pricing of
insurance products, by contrast, is currently a common commercial practice outside of the
employment setting.37 The story of the rise and fall of race-based pricing thus also
provides important insights and context for those interested in understanding the
development of gender-based life insurance pricing practices.
¶16
This discussion proceeds as follows. The Article begins in Part II with a brief
overview of the historical development of race-based pricing practices and an
introduction to the working class life insurance markets in which they developed. Part
III, the core of the Article, provides a more detailed examination of the postemancipation use of explicit race classifications by life insurance companies, the
development of segregated life insurance markets, and the discontinuance of race-based
32

For the argument that the anti-discrimination principle itself operates as a generalization not only to
prohibit irrelevant discrimination but also, and more importantly, to prohibit generalizations that appear to
rest on a sound statistical foundation, see FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES, AND
STEREOTYPES 151 (2003).
33
Many types of classifications, including state of residence, for example, have historically correlated with
mortality differences. E.g., Louis I. Dublin, Foreword to FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY, STATE AND
REGIONAL LIFE TABLES, 1939–41, at 6 (life tables for the white population of the United States, and certain
groups of States, by sex, showing wide variation in longevity and mortality within the United States).
34
See Lea Brilmayer, et al., Sex Discrimination in Employer-Sponsored Insurance Plans: A Legal and
Demographic Analysis, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 505, 538–58 (1980) (describing research with regard to both
race and sex and concluding that “all major investigators now believe that social, cultural, environmental,
and behavioral factors are more important than genetic or biological factors” in explaining such mortality
differences). Controversies over biological views of race revived toward the end of the twentieth century.
See, e.g., Evelyn Hammonds, Straw Men and Their Followers: The Return of Biological Race, IS RACE
“REAL”?, June 7, 2006, http://raceandgenomics.ssrc.org/Hammonds/ (citing as examples the public debate
provoked by RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS
STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE (1996), and a 2005 New York Times op-ed by the evolutionary
developmental biologist Dr. Armand Marie Leroi).
35
See, e.g., KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY
(1986); Kenneth S. Abraham, Efficiency and Fairness in Insurance Risk Classification, 71 VA. L. REV. 403
(1985); Kyle Logue & Ronen Avraham, Redistributing Optimally: Of Tax Rules, Legal Rules, and
Insurance, 56 TAX L. REV. 157, 222–26 (2003).
36
See discussion and accompanying notes infra Part III.B, III.D.
37
In the 1970s and 1980s, such distinctions were invalidated for employment-related insurance benefits,
leaving a discontinuity between insurance and annuity practices in the employment setting as compared to
private insurance obtained outside of the employment setting. See, e.g., Ariz. Governing Comm. for Tax
Deferred Annuity & Deferred Compensation Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 (1983); L.A. Dept. of Water &
Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
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pricing practices beginning after World War II. As reinforced by developments during
the following several decades, the use of race distinct mortality tables for pricing
purposes could no longer be sustained by the major players in life insurance industry.
II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF RACE CLASSIFICATIONS AND INSURANCE MARKETS
¶17

In the decades preceding the Civil War, Americans began to view numbers as a
“tool of mastery over both nature and society,” as pointed out by Drew Gilpin Faust in
her study of the Civil War.38 Moreover, by the mid-nineteenth century Americans had
“entered into what historian Patricia Cline Cohen has called ‘an infatuation with
numbers.’”39 Such quantification, in which “statistics emerged in close alliance with
notions of an expanding state,” often focused on “censuses, on demography, and on
mortality records.”40
¶18
Constructing categories for classifying data involved judgment in the choice of
variables by which the data are sorted. In antebellum America, race was a commonly
used variable.41 For example, as noted by Cohen, the 1840 census distinguished lunatics
and idiots by race but not by age, sex, or class “because it was assumed that race was the
most salient division of the population.”42
¶19
Because I focus primarily on the post-Civil War period, beginning with the end of
Reconstruction and ending with the modern civil rights era, this Article does not examine
in any detail the slavery-era history of American insurance and banking interests. The
resurgence of interest in black reparations has prompted new disclosures about the
slavery-era practices of major American institutions, including insurance companies.43
Insurance companies provided slaveholders coverage for damage to or death of their
slaves at rates substantially higher than for white lives and imposed certain coverage
restrictions, including confining policy amounts to two-thirds of actual value, and
covering only a limited term of years.44 Although emancipation ended the slavery-era
38

DREW GILPIN FAUST, THIS REPUBLIC OF SUFFERING: DEATH AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 251 (2008).
Id. (quoting COHEN, supra note 1, at 205).
40
Id.
41
COHEN, supra note 1, at 213.
42
Id. at 212–13. The preceding five censuses “had gradually departed from the Constitution’s bare
requirement to count the total population, first by creating, then by progressively refining, categories based
on age, sex, and color.” Id. at 176–77; see also MARGO J. ANDERSON, THE AMERICAN CENSUS: A SOCIAL
HISTORY (1988). The historical roots of a quantification, Cohen argues, reveal how the “concerns of the
moment led to a reformulation, along numerical lines,” of a subject about which people were formerly
“content to be imprecise.” COHEN, supra note 1, at 207. What people chose to measure “reveals not only
what was important to them but what they wanted to understand and, often, what they wanted to control.”
Id. at 206.
43
E.g., CAL. INS. CODE §§ 13810–13813 (requiring disclosure of slavery era insurance policies, effective in
2001); ILL. INS. CODE § 155.39 (requiring disclosure of slavery era policies, effective in 2004). The slavery
era disclosures, summarized in reports compiled by state insurance departments, comprise a “slavery era”
insurance registry.
44
See generally Sharon Ann Murphy, Securing Human Property: Slavery, Life Insurance, and
Industrialization in the Upper South, 25 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 615, 618 (2005) (observing that “the
proportion of insurance policies on the lives of urban slaves in the Upper South approximated that of white
male northeasterners by the mid-1850s” and that “fire insurance companies likewise began underwriting
slave lives”). A Baltimore life insurance company, which sold many slave policies through its Richmond
office prior to the Civil War, charged double the rate they charged for white lives of the same age, confined
policy amounts to two-thirds of actual value, and generally refused to insure for a term of more than seven
years. Id. at 623–24. Although this company initially prohibited coverage of slaves engaged in certain
39
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insurance business,45 race-based practices resurfaced in other life insurance markets
following Reconstruction.46
¶20
The Civil War focused attention on “the transience of life in the most dramatic
possible way.”47 After the Civil War, many veterans, both black and white, and their
survivors and dependents received benefits computed by reference to the veteran’s
service entitlement, not by age or life expectancy, under an expanded federal Civil War
pension system.48 Those included in the system received old age and survivors benefits
comparable to pension and social insurance programs later adopted in Europe;49 however,
many former slaves did not qualify for governmental benefits.50
¶21
Private businesses also responded to the growing needs of American families for
financial security in a period of rapid industrialization, social change, and increased
hazardous work, it later joined other companies in charging extra premiums for slaves engaged in
hazardous occupations on steamboats, railroads, in coal pits or mines, or as engineers or firemen. Id. at
638–39, 645–46. See also MILDRED F. STONE, SINCE 1845, A HISTORY OF THE MUTUAL BENEFIT LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY 19–20 (1957).
45
Murphy, supra note 44, at 651; see The Emancipation Proclamation issued by President Lincoln in
September, 1862, effective January 1, 1863; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (abolishing slavery in 1865).
46
State insurance department investigations and litigation have resulted in additional disclosure of postemancipation practices by insurance companies. Some states have required more comprehensive disclosure
of post-slavery race-based practices. For example, in 2000, the State of New York Insurance Department
directed each domestic and foreign life insurer and fraternal benefit society to review its past and current
underwriting practices regarding race-based underwriting and to report its findings to the Department no
later than August 15, 2000. The Department specified that all relevant documents be included in such a
review, including, but not limited to, rate charts, mortality tables, certain labor negotiation documents,
agent and broker contracts, compensation schedules, underwriting and agent manuals, applications, policy
form filings, board of directors (and committee) minutes, and internal memoranda. Memorandum,
Supplement No. 1 to Circular Letter No. 19, from State of New York Insurance Department to All Licensed
Life Insurers and Fraternal Benefit Societies (June 22, 2000), available at
http://www.ins.state.ny.us/circltr/2000/cl00_19_s1_00.htm (issued pursuant to section 308 of the New
York Insurance Law).
After reviewing information provided pursuant to the disclosure requirements, state insurance departments
have conducted more detailed examination of companies suspected of continuing race-based premium
structures and underwriting procedures. See, e.g., ACTUARIAL RESOURCES CORP., ACTUARIAL REPORT,
RACE-BASED PRICING ACTIVITIES WITH RESPECT TO THE LIFE INSURANCE BUSINESS OF WESTERN &
SOUTHERN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY (2003) (prepared for the Ohio Department of Insurance under
guidelines and procedures established by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners Race Based
Premium Working Group).
47
MORTON KELLER, THE LIFE INSURANCE ENTERPRISE, 1885–1910, at 7–8 (1963).
48
E.g., FAUST, supra note 38, at 268 (noting that “executing its obligations to the dead and their mourners”
through national cemeteries, pensions, and records that preserved identities “required a vast expansion of
the federal bureaucracy and a reconceptualization of the government’s role”); THEDA SKOCPOL,
PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS 102, 135–43 (1992) (noting that over several decades Civil War
pensions “evolved from a restricted program to compensate disabled veterans and the dependents of those
killed or injured in military service into an open-ended system of disability, old-age, and survivors’ benefits
for anyone who could claim minimal service time on the northern side of the Civil War”). Skocpol
estimated that by 1910, about twenty-eight percent of all American men aged sixty-five or more received
federal benefits averaging $189 a year, and over three hundred thousand widows, orphans, and other
dependents were also receiving benefits. Id. at 65. Between 1880 and 1910, she notes, the federal
government “devoted over a quarter of its expenditures to pensions distributed among the populace.” Id.
Survivor’s benefits were based on the veteran’s entitlement. Id. at 107, 129.
49
SKOCPOL, supra note 48, at 130–35, 134 tbl.3 (comparing average pensions in the United States,
Germany, and Britain in 1910 and 1912).
50
Id. at 135–38 (identifying the primary beneficiaries of Civil War pensions to be native-born and earlierimmigrant northerners, mostly from the middle classes, and stating that many workers and poor people
were left out altogether).
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economic vulnerability. As a result, the American life insurance business expanded
dramatically from the antebellum period through the Civil War. 51 A structure for state
supervision of the industry also formed at about that time, with the establishment of
insurance departments in Massachusetts in 1865,52 and the formation in 1871 of a
National Convention of Insurance Commissioners.53 By 1873, twelve states had some
form of insurance regulation.54
¶22
Following the Civil War, race-based practices first emerged in a specialized form
of life insurance marketed to low-income working people. Beginning in the 1870s,
newly formed American life insurance companies, including Prudential, Metropolitan
Life, and John Hancock,55 known later as the “Big Three,”56 sold small individual
policies to a growing market of low-income wage earners.57 This type of life insurance,
called “industrial” or “burial” insurance, provided protection against the financial burden
of a last illness and burial for the “industrious” classes.58
¶23
Although rates and benefits varied by age, they did not vary, at least initially, by
race of the insured, and were typically issued with fewer restrictions than other forms of
life insurance.59 Policies covered poor workers and their families, including newly
emancipated slaves, women, industrial workers, and their children.60 Industrial insurance
agents typically sold policies door-to-door in an assigned geographical area or “debit,”

51

KELLER, supra note 47, at 2–11 (describing the reasons for the growth of the American life insurance
enterprise from in the 1840s through the Civil War); see also SHEPARD B. CLOUGH, A CENTURY OF
AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE: A HISTORY OF THE MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW YORK, 1843–
1943, at 4–16 (1946).
52
KELLER, supra note 47, at 194; see also discussion supra at note 22.
53
KELLER, supra note 47, at 194.
54
Id.
55
The John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company was formed during the Civil War, in 1862, several
years prior to the other two companies. HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE JOHN HANCOCK MUTUAL LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY OF BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS, A HALF CENTURY COMPLETED, 1862–1912, at 18
(1912) [hereinafter HISTORICAL SKETCH]. Although both Prudential and Metropolitan Life began business
selling “industrial” insurance policies in the early 1870s, John Hancock did not sell industrial insurance
(also referred to by the company as weekly premium insurance) until 1879. Id. at 39, 76 (stating that the
first “weekly premium” policy was issued by John Hancock on July 9, 1879).
56
Although at least twenty different companies issued industrial insurance in 1905, Metropolitan,
Prudential, and John Hancock accounted for ninety-five percent of this business, and industrial insurance
constituted about seventeen percent of all life insurance. See Roger L. Ransom & Richard Sutch, Tontine
Insurance and the Armstrong Investigation: A Case of Stifled Innovation, 1868–1905, 47 J. OF ECON. HIST.
379, 385 n.15 (1987).
57
See discussion infra at Part III.B.
58
American industrial insurance companies initially patterned their business on the Prudential Friendly
Society of Great Britain, which grew out of the “friendly” and insurance societies developed in eighteenth
and nineteenth century England. MALVIN E. DAVIS, INDUSTRIAL LIFE INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 6
(1944). In America, Prudential began in a basement in Newark in 1875 as the Prudential Friendly Society
and two years later changed its name to the Prudential Insurance Company of America. Metropolitan,
which at that time provided life insurance for a mutual assistance and social organization for German
immigrants, the Hildise Bund, began selling policies on the English Prudential model several years later.
MARQUIS JAMES, THE METROPOLITAN LIFE, A STUDY IN BUSINESS GROWTH 43–44, 61, 73–93 (1947); see
also John F. Dryden, President, The Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., Statement on “Industrial Insurance” Made
to A Select Committee of the New Jersey Senate Appointed to Investigate Life Insurance 24 (July 19,
1906). See also discussion infra at Part III.
59
See discussion infra at Part III.
60
See discussion infra at Part III.B.
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and collected premiums of a few cents each week to cover each insured member of the
household.61
¶24
By the beginning of the twentieth century, as observed by Louis Brandeis in his
Progressive-era study of industrial insurance, industrial policies were “considered a prime
necessity among the working people,” and constituted approximately three-fourths of
then existing level premium life insurance policies.62 Industrial insurance remained an
important form of life insurance for low-income wage earners until the mid-twentieth
century, when the business began to decline.63
¶25
After Reconstruction, Prudential and other newly formed industrial insurance
companies began classifying former slaves as “excessive” mortality risks.64 Prudential
introduced a race-distinct rate and benefit structure in 1881, followed later the same year
by Metropolitan Life.65 Soon thereafter, certain states began prohibiting life insurance
companies from charging race-differentiated rates.66 Prudential withdrew business from
those states and later stopped soliciting black business everywhere.67 Metropolitan
withdrew its business from states with anti-discrimination laws but continued to sell race
distinct policies elsewhere. Metropolitan later resumed business in states with antidiscrimination laws, but adopted other less visible race-based practices in those
markets.68 Black self-help organizations and black-owned insurance companies formed
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to respond to economic needs
unmet by white companies.69 As a result, insurance markets became highly racesegregated.
¶26
As discussed in greater detail in Part III below, following improvements in living
standards after World War II and the reforms sought by the Civil Rights Movement,
insurance markets became more integrated, black insurance companies faced new
competitive pressures, and explicit race-based rates for newly issued life insurance
policies were rejected as a vestige of the Jim Crow past.70 By the 1970s, “ordinary” life
insurance71 business had surpassed the industrial business for most major insurers. The
61

DAVIS, supra note 58, at 7.
See Louis D. Brandeis, Wage-Earners’ Life Insurance, COLLIER’S: THE NAT’L WKLY., Sept. 15, 1906,
reprinted in ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, THE BRANDEIS WAY: A CASE STUDY IN THE WORKINGS OF
DEMOCRACY 311, 312–13 APPENDIX II (1938) (proposing legislative reforms aimed at industrial insurance).
Under level premium life insurance policies, premiums remain the same every year throughout the term of
the contract but vary by the age at which the insured makes the contract with the insurer. CLOUGH, supra
note 51, at 13 (noting that level premium policies were introduced from England and established in
America between 1843 and 1870).
63
Despite its importance in proportion to overall numbers of policyholders, industrial insurance remained a
small proportion of the dollar amount of insurance in force. KELLER, supra note 47, at 286 tbl.11 (showing
life insurance in force from 1900 to 1960, and comparing the amounts of ordinary and industrial life
insurance in force during those years with credit and group insurance in force from 1920 to 1960).
64
See discussion infra at Part III.B.1.
65
Id.
66
See discussion infra at Part III.B.2.
67
Id.
68
See discussion infra at Part III.B.3.
69
See discussion infra at Part III.C.
70
After newly issued policies with explicit race-based rates or benefits were eliminated, the battle to
eliminate discriminatory practices in insurance then shifted to the more subtle ground of underwriting and
“red-lining” issues. See infra notes 260 and 291 and accompanying text.
71
Ordinary life insurance policies were generally sold in increments of $1,000, with premiums payable by
mail on a monthly or less frequent basis. The premiums on ordinary life insurance policies were beyond
62
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original “Big Three” discontinued selling new industrial policies, leaving the industrial
market to smaller companies.72 Some of the remaining industrial companies did not
revise their policies until the early 1980s, or later for a few small companies based in the
South.73 A few Jim Crow era policies, issued with higher premiums or lower benefits for
black policyholders, may remain in force even today.74
III. THE RISE AND FALL OF RACE-BASED LIFE INSURANCE POLICIES
¶27

One of the first studies of race-based practices in the insurance industry to reach a
wide audience was An American Dilemma,75 a comprehensive survey of American race
relations cited by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education.76 The Carnegiefunded study,77 directed over a five-year period in the late 1930s and early 1940s by the
Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal,78 examined the issue of race relations across a wide
range of categories, including demographics, economics, politics, justice, social
stratification, and social inequality. Myrdal’s detailed analysis of the conflict between
American democratic ideals and racism influenced a generation of judges79 and
policymakers during World War II and the Cold War period.80
¶28
In his analysis of the financial industry, Myrdal described how early mutual aid
and benevolent societies81 and post-slavery race-based practices of major insurance
the economic reach of the poor and working class until living standards more generally improved in the
later part of the twentieth century.
72
ROBERT A. MARSHALL & ELI A. ZUBAY, THE DEBIT SYSTEM OF MARKETING LIFE AND HEALTH
INSURANCE 24 (1975).
73
Scott J. Paltrow, Past Due: In Relic of ‘50s and ‘60s, Blacks Still Pay More For a Type of Insurance—
Companies Ended Dual Rates on New ‘Burial Policies But Didn’t Fix Old Ones—‘White Risks’ & ‘Negro
Risks’, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 2000, at A1 (discussing investigation of five companies by Florida’s
insurance department).
74
As explained in Part III.B.4, although explicit race-based rates and benefits were largely eliminated for
newly issued policies by the early 1980s, some African-Americans still pay higher premiums or receive
lower benefits under race-differentiated policies issued in the past. See cases cited infra notes 180–182.
75
MYRDAL, supra note 2.
76
347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954) (rejecting the doctrine of “separate but equal” and holding that race
segregated public schools violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). Writing for
the unanimous Court in Brown, Chief Justice Earl Warren observed that segregation is usually interpreted
as denoting inferiority and cited as support psychological studies published by Kenneth Clark and others,
and more generally, Myrdal’s An American Dilemma. Id. at 494 n.11.
77
See F.P. Keppel, Foreword to MYRDAL, supra note 2, at v–viii (describing the genesis and scope of the
study).
78
See MYRDAL, supra note 2, at ix–xx. Thirty years after his study was published, Myrdal was awarded
the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1974, shared with Friedrich August von Hayek, “for their pioneering work
in the theory of money and economic fluctuations and for their penetrating analysis of the interdependence
of economic, social and institutional phenomena." See Nobelprize.org, The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in
Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 1974, http://nobelprize.org/economics/laureates/1974/ (last
visited Sept. 23, 2009).
79
Myrdal’s book was first cited by Justice Frankfurter in Hughes v. Superior Court of California, 339 U.S.
460, 463 (1950) (noting that “[d]iscrimination against Negroes in employment has brought a variety of
legal issues before this Court in recent years” and citing cases and Myrdal’s An American Dilemma).
80
See, e.g., MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925–
1950, at 119 (1987); see also KLARMAN, supra note 10, at 355, 426; see generally MARY DUDZIAK, COLD
WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 7–9, 79–114 (2000).
81
MYRDAL, supra note 2, at 955. Mutual aid and benevolent societies provided forms of self-help to their
members. They generally were funded through membership fees for the purpose of caring for the sick and
providing burial at death. E.g., JOHN SIBLEY BUTLER, ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND SELF-HELP AMONG BLACK
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companies led to the development of African-American owned and managed insurance
companies.82 Although Myrdal’s summary goes into little detail of the use of race
classifications by the insurance business, the underlying survey paper from which he
drew his conclusions provides more background and context.83
¶29
Additional historical information now available, and events occurring after the
1944 publication of An American Dilemma, tell a story of the insurance business
responding to legal and social changes over a period of more than a century. Social and
economic changes occurring after the publication of An American Dilemma, including the
victory over the Nazi regime in World War II, pressure from the NAACP Legal Defense
Fund and other civil rights groups on the issue of race-based rates and benefits, as well as
integration of economic markets more generally, led to changes in race-based insurance
practices.
A. Legal and Economic Context: After Reconstruction
¶30

Many of the race-based practices of life insurance companies developed after
Reconstruction, during a period of social and political retrenchment following the civil
rights reforms of the 1860s and 1870s. Shortly after the Civil War, during the short-lived
Reconstruction era, Congress established the Freedman’s Bureau84 and enacted civil
rights legislation.85 The financial panic of 1873, followed by a severe economic
depression and political changes in the North, impeded further efforts at reconstruction in
the South.86 After 1877, the federal government withdrew its troops from southern
statehouses and federal supervision of elections ceased.87 Through a combination of
terror and violence, including lynching,88 and various other less violent means such as
poll taxes and literacy tests, white supremacists systematically disenfranchised blacks
throughout the South.89
AMERICANS: A RECONSIDERATION OF RACE AND ECONOMICS 109–10 (1991).
82

See additional discussion infra in Part III.C.
Ira DeA. Reid, The Negro in the American Economic System Vol. I 37–69 (1940) (unpublished
manuscript prepared for the study, on file with the Schomburg Collection of the New York Public Library).
84
Second Freedmen's Bureau Act, ch. 200, 14 Stat. 173 (1866) (enacting a federal bureau to assist
freedmen and refugees to enable them to become “self-supporting citizens of the United States, and to aid
them in making the freedom conferred by proclamation of the commander-in-chief, by emancipation under
the laws of the States, and by constitutional amendment, available to them and beneficial to the republic”).
85
E.g., Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (1875) (mandating equal access to accommodations
regardless of race); Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (securing the rights of citizenship to
all persons born in the United States and granting those citizens the same rights to enter into contracts as
white citizens). In the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, civil rights litigators relied on the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 to challenge race-based insurance rates. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–1982.
86
See, e.g., ERIC FONER, FOREVER FREE: THE STORY OF EMANCIPATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 190 (2005)
[hereinafter FONER, FOREVER FREE].
87
Reconstruction Act of 1867, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428 (1867) (establishing military rule over the Rebel
States); see also, e.g., ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863–1877, at
575–87 (1988) [hereinafter FONER, RECONSTRUCTION] (describing the declining commitment of the federal
government to reconstruction and withdrawal of federal troops after the Hayes-Tilden agreement of 1877).
88
KLARMAN, supra note 10, at 3 (stating that by 1895, Booker T. Washington had acquiesced in black
disenfranchisement and segregation and urged southern blacks to instead pursue education and economic
advancement, and that from 1895–1900, an average of about one-hundred blacks were lynched a year,
mostly in the South).
89
E.g., FONER, FOREVER FREE, supra note 86, at 194–213; PETER KOLCHIN, AMERICAN SLAVERY 1619–
1877, at 229–36 (1993).
83
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¶31

At the end of the nineteenth century, the United States Supreme Court, which had
earlier issued restrictive rulings on post-Civil War constitutional amendments90 and civil
rights legislation,91 upheld state Jim Crow laws in Plessy v. Ferguson.92 Plessy ushered
in a period of state-sanctioned racial subordination that extended into the latter half of the
twentieth century.93
¶32
As discussed in greater detail below, the race-based practices developed by the
industrial insurance industry mirrored the dominant racial ideology of white supremacy.
Classifying blacks as inferior by “nature,” and thus as “substandard” insurance risks,
race-distinct pricing structures became firmly entrenched in the insurance industry during
the Jim Crow period.
¶33
The era of state-sanctioned race segregation finally ended at least a decade after
the Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education94 with the social and legislative
changes accomplished by the Civil Rights Movement during the second Reconstruction.95
After a brief introductory discussion of related developments before the Civil War, this
section focuses on the rise and fall of race-based insurance practices during the Jim Crow
era.
1. Before the Civil War: Self-Help for Free Blacks and Slaves

¶34

In the late eighteenth century, church relief and mutual aid societies were
organized by free blacks in the North, and later in the South, to provide a form of selfhelp for themselves and their families in the event of sickness and death.96 Although
mutual aid and benevolent societies had come into existence before the Revolution97 and
were fairly common among master craftsmen, journeymen, and apprentices, white
90

United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (invalidating portions of the civil rights act of 1875).
92
163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (upholding separate facilities for blacks under the Fourteenth Amendment). In
rejecting the proposition that equal rights could be achieved through “an enforced commingling of the two
races,” the Court observed that “[l]egislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts or to abolish
distinctions based on physical differences.” Id. at 551.
93
E.g., KLARMAN, supra note 10.
94
347 U.S. 483, 493 (1945) (overturning Plessy’s "separate but equal" doctrine as a violation of equal
protection guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment).
95
Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (1968); Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No.
89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964); Civil
Rights Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-449, 74 Stat. 86 (1960); Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315,
71 Stat. 634 (1957).
96
ARMAND J. THIEBLOT, JR. & LINDA PICKTHORNE FLETCHER, NEGRO EMPLOYMENT IN FINANCE: A
STUDY OF RACIAL POLICIES IN BANKING AND INSURANCE, VOL. II—STUDIES OF NEGRO EMPLOYMENT,
APPENDIX A, HISTORY OF NEGRO LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES 124 (1970) [hereinafter FLETCHER, THE
NEGRO IN THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY]; E. FRANKLIN FRAZIER, THE NEGRO IN THE UNITED STATES 368–69
(1957); James B. Browning, The Beginnings of Insurance Enterprise Among Negroes, 22 J. OF NEGRO
HIST. 417, 418, 420–24 (1937); George W. Hines & George Wm. Cook, No. 11 Negro Insurance,
Commercial College Studies of Negroes in Business, 9 HOWARD U. RECORD 9 (1915); see PHILIP S. FONER,
HISTORY OF BLACK AMERICANS 557 (1975) [hereinafter FONER, HISTORY OF BLACK AMERICANS] (stating
that the first black mutual aid society was organized in Providence, Rhode Island, as early as 1780;
providing details about Philadelphia’s “Free Africa Society,” organized in 1787 by Allen and Jones,
including its appeal to the city to rent a portion of Philadelphia’s potter’s field for the burial of its dead; and
describing the establishment of similar societies in New York and other Northern and Southern cities).
97
See ROBERT A. MARSHALL & ELI A. ZUBAY, THE DEBIT SYSTEM OF MARKETING LIFE AND HEALTH
INSURANCE 15 (1975).
91
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benevolent and fraternal societies98 generally did not open their membership to blacks.99
Blacks thus founded their own societies.100
¶35
Black-founded societies served as centers of religious and social activity, and
were important factors in the lives of free blacks101 and, to some extent, the slaves.102
The societies collected small initiation fees and periodic payments. Free black
benevolent societies provided aid to the disabled or aged, as well as burial benefits and
annuities for the survivors of deceased members.103
¶36
The growth of benevolent organizations, along with black fraternal organizations
and lodges,104 laid the foundation for the structure of the black insurance business.105
98

Although the differences have been labeled as “relatively minor,” mutual benefit (or benevolent)
societies differed from fraternal societies in that “they lacked ritual and typically had only a local
membership.” DAVID M. FAHEY, THE BLACK LODGE IN WHITE AMERICA: “TRUE REFORMER” BROWNE
AND HIS ECONOMIC STRATEGY 5 (1994) [hereinafter FAHEY, THE BLACK LODGE].
99
FONER, HISTORY OF BLACK AMERICANS, supra note 96, at 557; Alvin Schmidt & Nicholas Babchuk, The
Unbrotherly Brotherhood: Discrimination in Fraternal Orders, 34 PHYLON 275, 276–77 (1973); see also
Mary Ann Clawson, Fraternal Orders and Class-Formation in the Nineteenth Century United States, 27
COMP. STUD. IN SOC’Y & HIST. 672, 692–93 (1985).
100
One of the first black fraternal organizations was formed in 1776 by Prince Hall, of West Indian origin.
FONER, HISTORY OF BLACK AMERICANS, supra note 96, at 559–61. In 1787, a warrant was granted to the
Prince Hall freemasons to operate as African Lodge No. 459 by the Grand Lodge of England. Id.
American Masons refused to recognize the legitimacy of the all-black organization, however, and blacks
were also barred from membership in white Masonic lodges. Some white Masonic groups in America
refuse to recognize the Prince Hall freemasons even today. See, e.g., Shaila Dewan & Robbie Brown,
Black Member Tests Message of Masons in Georgia Lodges, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2009, at A15 (stating that
mainstream Masons began recognizing the Prince Hall group in about 1990, when “a thaw began in
Connecticut and spread to all but 10 states” and noting that the hold-outs were mostly the former
Confederate states, including Georgia); Black, White Masons in South Struggle with Racial Separation,
MSNBC ONLINE, Oct. 24, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15405618/ (reporting that grand lodges in
thirty-eight states, beginning in the late twentieth century, have granted mutual recognition to the Prince
Hall masons but that Masons in North Carolina voted against granting such recognition in the fall of 2006;
mutual recognition has not been granted by grand lodges in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia).
101
MYRDAL, supra note 2, at 317 (noting that New Orleans had several hundred benevolent societies in the
mid-1930s, one of which had been founded in the 1780s); Hines & Cook, supra note 96, at 8 (noting that a
pamphlet issued by the Pennsylvania Society for Promoting Abolition of Slavery in 1838 listed eighty
beneficial societies).
102
Hines & Cook, supra note 96, at 7–8 (quoting from a 1904 Hampton Negro Conference Report: “While
there are no records available, yet from reliable sources we learn that more than seventy-five years ago
there existed in every city of any size in Virginia, organizations of Negroes having as their object the caring
for the sick and the burying of the dead”).
103
E.g., Robert L. Harris, Jr., Charleston’s Free Afro-American Elite: The Brown Fellowship Society and
the Humane Brotherhood, 82 S. CAROLINA HIST. MAG. 289, 290 (Oct. 1981) (formed in 1790 and 1843,
respectively, these societies provided sick and death benefits as well as burial plots and funeral services);
see also FONER, HISTORY OF BLACK AMERICANS, supra note 96, at 559.
104
By 1860, black Masonic lodges could be found in eighteen states and in Canada. See Edward Nelson
Palmer, Negro Secret Societies, 23 SOC. FORCES 207, 208 (1944). The Independent Order of Odd Fellows
rejected the application for membership by a group of free blacks formed as the Philomathean Institute of
New York. Following its acceptance by an Odd Fellow lodge in England, the Philomathean Lodge in New
York City was founded in 1843. FRAZIER, supra note 96, at 371. Black Odd Fellows lodges later became
so widespread that W.E.B. DuBois observed that the Odd Fellows were the “most powerful and flourishing
secret order” in America. W.E.B. DUBOIS, THE PHILADELPHIA NEGRO 222, 224 (1899, reprinted in 1973
ed.) (noting that fraternal organizations provided blacks certain social benefits as well as “insurance from
misfortune”).
105
FLETCHER, THE NEGRO IN THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY, supra note 96, at 124; see also JOHN HOPE
FRANKLIN & ALFRED A. MOSS, JR., FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF AFRICAN AMERICANS 287
(7th ed. 1994) (“A logical outcome of the mutual benefit societies was black insurance companies, which
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Over time, benevolent societies and fraternal organizations declined in popularity, while
life insurance sold by insurance companies grew in importance as a source of economic
security.106
2. After the Civil War: Economic Challenges
¶37

In the post-Civil War period, newly emancipated blacks encountered serious
social and economic challenges.107 After the Freedman’s Savings and Trust Company
failed in 1874,108 many freed blacks became suspicious of banks as repositories for
savings.109 Faced with poverty, illness, and the death of family members, emancipated
blacks turned to churches and to fraternal and benevolent organizations for economic and
social protection.110 Some former slaves also purchased coverage from industrial
insurance companies selling small individual insurance policies designed for low-income
wage earners.111
¶38
The following three sections discuss the parallel development of race-based
practices of white insurance companies and the organization and operation of twentieth
century black-owned and managed insurance companies. Black-owned life insurance
companies developed from the experience with insurance programs provided by late
nineteenth century black fraternal and benevolent societies.
B. Industrial or “Debit” Insurance: Race-Based Rates and Sales Restrictions
¶39

Black policyholders first became an important factor for major white insurance
companies in the 1870s, the decade after emancipation.112 During that period, insurance
companies began selling industrial policies, a life insurance business characterized by
small policies and frequent premiums.113 Premiums were collected house-to-house in
multiples of five or ten cents a week, with variations for different ages in the amount of
insurance purchased. Coverage could be purchased for every family member.114
Sometimes referred to as “debit” insurance because premiums were collected by
company representatives in an assigned fixed area known as a “debit,”115 industrial
were more economic than social in their functions.”). These developments are discussed in greater detail
infra at Part III.C.
106
MYRDAL, supra note 2, at 955 (suggesting that one of the reasons for their decline in popularity was
their frequent failure to pay sickness and death benefits, especially since the beginning of the depression in
1929).
107
E.g., FONER, RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 87; see also EDWARD L. AYERS, THE PROMISE OF THE NEW
SOUTH: LIFE AFTER RECONSTRUCTION 132–59 (15th ed. 2007).
108
FONER, FOREVER FREE, supra note 86, at 193.
109
Id.
110
C. ERIC LINCOLN & LAWRENCE H. MAMIYA, THE BLACK CHURCH IN THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN
EXPERIENCE 244–49 (2003); MYRDAL, supra note 2, at 955 (noting that the death benefit and sickness
insurance features of lodges and benevolent societies made the lodges “of almost equal importance with the
churches in the period around 1890”).
111
See introductory discussion of industrial insurance supra Part II.
112
MARQUIS JAMES, THE METROPOLITAN LIFE: A STUDY IN BUSINESS GROWTH 338 (1947).
113
FREDERICK L. HOFFMAN, HISTORY OF THE PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA 3 (1900)
[hereinafter HOFFMAN, HISTORY OF THE PRUDENTIAL].
114
DAVIS, supra note 58, at 6–7 (noting that children, ages one through ten, could be insured for as little as
three cents per week).
115
Id. (explaining that the agent would report premium payments in bulk and keep detailed records of

374

Vol. 4:2]

Mary Heen

insurance served mainly to provide wage earners funds for a last illness and a decent
burial.116 Because industrial insurance was within the reach of poorly paid workers,
companies began selling insurance to former slaves.117
1. Emergence of Race-Based Rates
¶40

Both the Prudential Life Insurance Company, beginning in the mid-1870s,118 and
Metropolitan Life, which issued its first industrial policy in 1879,119 initially issued such
policies on blacks at the same rates as whites.120 By the beginning of 1881, however,
Prudential had begun to charge higher premium rates to cover black children and reduced
benefits of black adults by one-third to cover their “excessive” mortality.121 Metropolitan
had stopped writing insurance on blacks,122 but resumed writing policies on blacks later
in 1881 at two-thirds the benefits given whites.123
2. Reaction to Early State Laws Prohibiting Race-Based Insurance Rates

¶41

In response to these developments, Massachusetts passed a law in 1884
forbidding race-based life insurance rates or benefits.124 According to Metropolitan’s
premium payments on individual policies issued to each family). The novelist Philip Roth, in a memoir
published after his father’s death, describes childhood memories of hearing of his father’s work collecting
door-to-door on a “colored debit,” stories “of the eerie evenings collecting pennies from the poorest of
Newark’s poor, stories from thirty-eight years with the Metropolitan.” PHILIP ROTH, PATRIMONY, A TRUE
STORY 108–09 (1991). I’m grateful to my colleague, Professor Shari Motro, for this reference.
116
See Brandeis, supra note 62, at 311, app. II at 312–13. Brandeis argued that industrial insurance placed
an undue burden on working people through the companies’ high management expenses, high lapse rates,
and premiums double that payable for any given amount payable on ordinary life nonparticipating policies.
Id. at 314–15. Brandeis also urged the establishment of “savings bank life insurance” to take the place of
industrial insurance. Id.
117
JAMES, supra note 112, at 338.
118
Reid, supra note 83, at 38; see also HOFFMAN, HISTORY OF THE PRUDENTIAL, supra note 113, at 1, 58.
119
JAMES, supra note 112, at 87. The John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company also began selling
industrial insurance policies at that time. Both companies were already selling ordinary life insurance
policies. DAVIS, supra note 58, at 6.
120
JAMES, supra note 112, at 338. In a prospectus of Prudential, which contained the first adult rate table
used by the company (covering ages eleven to seventy-five), benefits were limited to a maximum of $25
per week for sickness and $500 in case of death. No medical examination was necessary. HOFFMAN,
HISTORY OF THE PRUDENTIAL, supra note 113, at 70–71, 73.
121
See HOFFMAN, HISTORY OF THE PRUDENTIAL, supra note 113, at 137–38. Hoffman’s study reproduces a
memorandum issued in March of 1881, by John F. Dryden, Secretary of the Prudential, in which he
instructed agents that two changes would be made “with respect to colored persons (Negroes) applying for
insurance in this company” under policies issued on and after March 28, 1881: 1) “Under adult policies the
sum assured will be one-third less than now granted for the same weekly premium”; and 2) “Under
infantile policies, the amount insured will be the same as now, but the weekly premiums will be increased
to five cents.” Id. at 137. The changes were “in consequence of the excessive mortality prevailing in the
class above named” and that “rate tables would be sent to them for use with colored applicants.” Id.
Hoffman’s study also contains the “Adult Rate Table for Colored Risks,” first used April 4, 1881. Id. at
138.
122
JAMES, supra note 112, at 338.
123
Id. at 86 (describing that this practice, dictated entirely by the greater mortality risk of “colored
persons,” was misconstrued as racial discrimination “in the face of proof that color had nothing to do with
it”).
124
SUPPLEMENT TO THE PUBLIC STATUTES OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, ch. 235, §1
(1884), provided as follows: “No life company shall make any distinction or discrimination between white
persons and colored persons wholly or partly of African descent, as to the premiums or rates charged for
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historian, “[a]fter unavailing protests the companies discontinued soliciting Negro risks
in that state.”125 When several other states passed similar laws,126 “Prudential went
further and stopped doing business with Negroes everywhere.”127 The laws could not
require the companies to solicit black business, as pointed out by a historian writing
about the companies’ reaction, and “most companies, Metropolitan included, instructed
their agents not to solicit it in those states.”128
¶42
By contrast, other coverage restrictions were significantly liberalized during this
era.129 Prudential discontinued restrictions on hazardous occupations, except for military
policies upon the lives of such persons; nor shall any such company demand or require greater premiums
from such colored persons than are at that time required by such company from white persons of the same
age, sex, general condition of health and prospect of longevity; nor shall any such company make or require
any rebate, diminution or discount upon the amount to be paid on such policy in case of the death of such
colored person insured . . . . Any such company which shall refuse the application of any such colored
person for insurance upon such person’s life shall furnish such person, on his request therefore, with the
certificate of a regular examining physician of such company who made the examination, stating that such
refusal was not because such applicant is a person of color, but solely upon such grounds of the general
health and prospect of longevity of such person as would be applicable to white persons of the same age
and sex.”
Three years later, the statute was recodified and amended to add the following additional language at the
end of the first sentence above: “nor insert in the policy any condition, nor make any stipulation whereby
such person insured shall bind himself or his heirs, executors, administrators and assigns to accept any sum
less than the full value or amount of such policy in case of a claim accruing thereon by reason of the death
of such person insured, other than such as are imposed upon white persons in similar cases; and any such
stipulation or condition so made or inserted shall be void.” SUPPLEMENT TO THE PUBLIC STATUTES OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, ch. 215, § 69 (1887).
125
JAMES, supra note 112, at 338.
126
Id. at 338 n.70 (listing Connecticut, 1887; Ohio, 1889; New York, 1891, Michigan, 1893; Minnesota,
1895; New Jersey, 1902; Rhode Island, which had a law by 1894 but repealed it before 1906); see also
CHARLES S. MANGUM, JR., THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE NEGRO 70 (1940).
127
JAMES, supra note 112, at 338. According to Hoffman’s account, published in 1900, although
Prudential “accepts applications from negroes and issues policies without rating, it does not solicit this
class of risks, and has, therefore, comparatively few colored persons as policyholders on its books.”
HOFFMAN, HISTORY OF THE PRUDENTIAL, supra note 113, at 139. He refers readers to his “full discussion
of the entire subject of negro mortality” in his book on the race traits and tendencies of the American
Negro, published in 1896. Id.
128
JAMES, supra note 112, at 86. Few historical details are available about the early race-based policies of
the other member of the “Big Three,” the John Hancock Company, which was the first mutual life company
to issue an industrial insurance policy. However, a consulting actuary who served as an expert witness for
the company, reported after reviewing company records that John Hancock did not develop dual rate plans;
instead, the company established a practice of not soliciting black business and not paying sales
commissions on African-American policies. According to the report, the company did not begin to solicit
African-American business until sometime around 1953, and after that time paid full sales commissions for
African-Americans and whites for either ordinary or industrial policies. The company thereafter monitored
the percentage of sales to African-Americans. The expert reported that a total of about seventy million
industrial policies were sold by John Hancock through 1967, when it discontinued selling industrial
policies. About 550,000 policies of that total were sold to African-Americans during that time, with about
400,000 sold from 1954 to 1967. See generally Expert Witness Report of Randall Mire, Norflet v. John
Hancock Fin. Services, Inc. and John Hancock Life Ins. Co., No. 04-1099 (D. Conn. Jan. 29, 2007) (rulings
on motion to compel discovery).
129
Industrial policies were generally less restrictive than ordinary policies, except that initially, adult
weekly premium policies contained standard terms (applicable also to the ordinary branch) that “in case of
death by the hands of justice or the consequences of violating or attempting to violate law, or in
consequence of habits of intemperance, existing at the policy date or acquired afterwards, the policy could
be avoided.” See HISTORICAL SKETCH, supra note 55, at 78. These conditions were dropped for industrial
policies issued by the company after July of 1884. Id. See also DAVIS, supra note 58, at 9–10 (discussing
more generally these types of restrictive clauses in early industrial policies).
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service, in 1884.130 It briefly eliminated the military service restriction at the end of the
century. Neither Prudential nor Metropolitan charged higher rates for members of the
armed forces during the Spanish-American War.131
¶43
Metropolitan, unlike Prudential, continued selling to blacks at higher rates in
states that did not prohibit race-differentiated rates.132 Although Metropolitan continued
to sell policies to blacks, careful selection of black risks was “deemed necessary,” and “a
full medical examination” was required in every case.133 Under those special selection
conditions, Metropolitan decided in 1894 that the higher rates for black risks could be
discontinued, and blacks were again sold policies at the same premium as whites.134 At
the same time, solicitation of business in states with anti-discrimination laws resumed.135
3. The Influence of Race Ideology: Standard and Substandard Policies
In 1896, the year of the Supreme Court’s decision in Plessy v. Ferguson,136
Prudential’s statistician, Frederick Hoffman, a German immigrant who had married into a
southern white family and lived for a time in the South,137 published a study of black
mortality rates.138 He found that black mortality rates for most age groups were nearly
twice those of whites and that at all age groups blacks had a lower life expectancy than
whites.139 Although Hoffman’s later work tied the prevalence of certain diseases in the
general population, such as cancer and tuberculosis, to social, economic, and
environmental conditions, he did not similarly attribute black mortality to such
conditions.140
¶45
Hoffman argued instead that black mortality and black health were the function of
innate racial traits of blacks, concluding that the numbers proved that blacks were
biologically inferior to whites, and attributed the statistics to their “low state of

¶44

130

HOFFMAN, HISTORY OF THE PRUDENTIAL, supra note 113, at 155. Prudential industrial policyholders
included, among other occupations, bartenders, blacksmiths, machinists, carpenters, railway employees,
and miners. Id. at 304 (noting industrial policyholders dying in 1897 and 1898). In 1898, Prudential was
insuring, among many other occupations, nearly 18,000 miners, 16,000 machinists, 30,000 carpenters, and
113,000 laborers on industrial policies. Id. at 306. It is not clear from Hoffman’s description of the change
in policy whether or not hazardous occupations were at that time treated by Prudential as substandard risks
subject to rates different from standard risks.
131
KELLER, supra note 47, at 55–56 (describing the liberalization of policy terms from the 1870s to the
1890s).
132
JAMES, supra note 112, at 338.
133
Id.
134
Id. See also WINFRED OCTAVUS BRYSON, JR., NEGRO LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF THE OPERATING AND FINANCIAL EXPERIENCE OF NEGRO LEGAL RESERVE LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANIES 8 (1948) (listing 1893 as the year that Metropolitan Life equalized the benefits for colored and
white risks).
135
JAMES, supra note 112, at 338.
136
163 U.S. 537, 551–52 (1896) (sanctioning “Jim Crow laws”).
137
See Paul Finkelman, Introduction to FREDERICK L. HOFFMAN, RACE TRAITS AND TENDENCIES OF THE
AMERICAN NEGRO i–vii (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd., 2004) (1896) [hereinafter HOFFMAN, RACE
TRAITS].
138
Id. at v (describing in the preface his ten-year investigation of “longevity and physiological peculiarities
among the colored population”). In Hoffman’s view, his study would not be in vain if it led to “more
scientific attention to the relations between the superior and inferior races.” Id. at viii.
139
Id. at iv.
140
Id. at ii–vi.
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morality.”141 He wrote that “modern educational and philanthropic efforts” had made
blacks even more “dependent on the white man” than slavery, and rejected the idea that
private charity or public programs could change the social condition of blacks.142 He
viewed blacks as a dying race, and accordingly, not good insurance risks.143 Hoffman’s
mortality studies also provided a “scientific” justification for race discrimination more
generally.144
¶46
In 1907, new industrial mortality tables were adopted,145 and the underlying data
showed that black mortality rates were substantially in excess of white mortality rates.146
Rather than continue to write policies on the same premium rates, which the Metropolitan
historian noted, “would have been discrimination against the whites,” the company
adopted a new policy.147 A set of plans were prepared “on a basis providing for extra
mortality, with cash values computed on [] special tables and dividends based on the
actual mortality experience,” along with a line of plans for persons of standard
mortality.148 When a black person was issued a standard policy rather than a policy for
substandard risks, the extra mortality was taken into account by allowing no issue
commission to the agent.149
¶47
As a result, race and age again became major defining classifications for
Metropolitan in computing rates and benefits provided under the policies. At that time,
insurance company experience showed comparable or greater mortality rate differentials
at certain ages when industrial policyholders were classified by gender,150 as by race.151
141

Id. at vi.
Id.
143
Id.
144
Id. at vi. In addition, Professor Finkelman notes that there is “some evidence that some southern white
politicians used Hoffman’s work to argue for black disfranchisement.” Id. at iv.
145
Prior to 1907, industrial companies based their premium rates on mortality tables compiled by individual
companies from their own experience. HENRY MOIR, ET AL., SOURCES AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
PRINCIPAL MORTALITY TABLES 40 (1919), available at
http://www.archive.org/stream/sourcesandchara00wolfgoog#page/n4/mode/1up. The valuation of
industrial policies for regulatory purposes, on the other hand, was based on the tables used for ordinary
policies, the Actuaries, or Combined Experience for policies issued prior to 1901 and the American
Experience Table for policies issued after 1900. Id. After modification of New York state laws in 1906,
the Superintendent of Insurance for New York State adopted a table, based exclusively on the experience of
industrial policies, for regulation of industrial companies.
The Standard Industrial Mortality Table was based on the 1896–1906 experience of the Metropolitan
Life Insurance Company in records classified according to the year of issue and the age at entry. Id. The
rate of mortality shown by the table is lower than the American Experience table “from ages 10 to 21, then
higher to age 87 inclusive; and at the very old ages it of necessity becomes lower again” because of the
limit of life in the American Experience table. Id. at 41.
146
JAMES, supra note 112, at 339.
147
Id.
148
Id. See also NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE NEED FOR A
NEW MORTALITY TABLE AND RELATED TOPICS 87 (June 21, 1939) (stating that the mortality tables used for
valuation purposes by companies writing the most business was then the Standard Industrial Table, with a
Sub-Standard Industrial Table used for “special classes and sub-standard risks,” but that many of the
smaller companies still used the American Experience Table, which did not produce “sufficiently high
margins at ages over 40”).
149
JAMES, supra note 112, at 339.
150
For example, the industrial mortality experience for Prudential policyholders at the end of the nineteenth
century was more favorable for women ages twenty-five through fifty-four than for men at the same ages.
HOFFMAN, HISTORY OF THE PRUDENTIAL, supra note 113, at 311 (noting the industrial mortality experience
between 1891–1898 for white males and females, particularly the proportion of deaths at various ages). An
early twentieth century mortality study conducted by Metropolitan Life found greater mortality of white
142
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However, despite those mortality differentials, the industrial companies did not adopt
gender differentiated premiums or benefits. White men were generally treated more
favorably as a group for pricing purposes than white women, who had lesser average
mortality than white men at many age ranges, or than black women, who had average
mortality nearly comparable to that of white men at certain age ranges.152 Accordingly,
despite men’s greater average mortality risk when compared to women, men other than
black men were not generally treated as “substandard” risks for life insurance. The
companies thus treated white men as the “norm” for standard pricing purposes.
¶48
The 1907 industrial mortality table remained in general use until 1948.153 In the
early 1940s, a new updated industrial table was created.154 At that time, a separate
“substandard” table was also constructed.155 As described by a leading insurance
textbook, the substandard table was “for the use of companies that write predominantly
Negro lives.”156 A study of mortality rates experienced by industrial companies
published prior to adoption of the new tables showed overall improvement in mortality
for both blacks and whites. The race differential remained, however, averaging eightythree percent higher than white mortality, but well over twice as high at certain ages.157
males than white females at all ages. LOUIS I. DUBLIN, ET AL., MORTALITY STATISTICS OF INSURED WAGEEARNERS AND THEIR FAMILIES: EXPERIENCE OF THE METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
INDUSTRIAL DEPARTMENT, 1911–1916, in THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 4 (1919) (observing that
47.8% of Metropolitan’s insured lives were white females and 12.5% were “colored policyholders,” of
which slightly more than half were female). Beginning with the age period of twenty to twenty-four years,
the excess of white male over white female mortality was over thirteen percent; between twenty-five and
thirty-four years, white males showed a mortality rate thirty-eight percent in excess of the rate for white
females; between thirty-five and forty-four years, was “the maximum point of excess in the mortality of
white males over that of white females, namely over seventy-two per cent [sic].” Id. at 20. The relative
excess of white male mortality began to decline after that age period, but never approached a figure nearer
than twelve percent at the highest significant age period in the study. Id. at 21.
151
See DUBLIN, supra note 150, at 15. The excess mortality rate for black males was highest for ages
fifteen to twenty-four years, over twice the rate for white males. Id. at 16. Between twenty-five and thirtyfour years, black males showed a mortality rate fifty-four percent in excess of the rate for white males;
between thirty-five and forty-four years, twenty percent in excess of the rate for white males; between
forty-five to sixty-four years, sixteen to seventeen percent in excess of the rate for white males; between
sixty-five to seventy-four, an excess of nearly six percent; and after age seventy-five, the rate of mortality
for white males exceeded that of black males. Id. at 16 tbl.7 (“Mortality from All Causes of Death
Combined: White Males and Colored Males Compared, Death Rates per 1,000 Persons Exposed, 1911–
1916”).
152
Although the death rate of black men was higher than for black women at all ages between ages twentyfive and seventy-five (with lower mortality among black males than black females from ages five to
twenty-four), the excess was never more than twenty percent, and thus, the excess was more moderate than
that observed between white men and women. Id. at 21–22.
153
DAN M. MCGILL, LIFE INSURANCE 149 (rev. ed. 1967).
154
This table was known as the 1941 Standard Industrial Table and was constructed based on the industrial
experience of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company for the period 1930–1939. Id. McGill describes
industrial insurance as follows: “It is sold to the lower income groups, with no medical examination, many
of the policyholders being employed in hazardous or unhealthful occupations and living in the less
desirable neighborhoods. Moreover, a large percentage of the policyholders are Negroes, particularly in the
South. As a result, the death rate among industrial policyholders is considerably higher than that among
ordinary insureds; and special mortality tables must be used in the calculation of premiums, reserves, and
surrender values.” Id.
155
This table was known as the 1941 Substandard Industrial Mortality Table. Id. at 150.
156
Id. (pointing out that no table is prescribed by law for calculation of minimum reserves or cash surrender
values for substandard insurance, but that the regulatory authorities usually review and approve the basis
actually used).
157
A study of mortality rates experienced by industrial insurance companies published prior to the adoption
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4. Equalizing Rates and Benefits and the Adoption of Race-Merged Tables
¶49

From the mid to late 1930s, Metropolitan and other white insurance companies
had been under increasing pressure from the civil rights community to end their racebased practices in various markets.158 In 1947, the United Office and Professional
Workers of America, a union affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organization
(CIO), began a campaign against race discrimination in insurance by writing letters to
Metropolitan, the CIO Committee to Abolish Discrimination, the National Urban League,
the NAACP, and state insurance commissioners around the country, reporting the results
of its survey finding that black applicants were restricted in certain cases to substandard
forms of insurance and that limitations were put on commissions to agents.159
¶50
For Metropolitan, the rates for policies issued under the new industrial mortality
tables were more favorable than the rates on policies issued under both the former
standard and substandard industrial policies. In 1948, the company began equalizing the
future death benefits on all existing premium paying and paid-up industrial policies, and
eliminated substandard risk plans prospectively.160 In 1963, guaranteed nonforfeiture
values on premium paying industrial policies were also increased for older policies in the
same proportion.161
¶51
In the early 1960s, a new “race-merged” or “integrated” industrial table, the
Commissioners 1961 Standard Industrial Mortality Table, was developed and constructed
from the 1954–1958 mortality experience of white males and females from eighteen
companies.162 Rather than produce separate standard and substandard tables,
“[s]ubstantial margins were introduced into the basic data to allow for difference in
company underwriting standards and the racial composition of the policyholder group,”
with the level of margins determined “in part by an examination of the experience for the
same period of eleven smaller companies, as well as some combined white and nonwhite
data.”163

of the new tables reported general improvement in industrial mortality experience for both white and black
lives, with greatest improvement at infantile ages and greater overall improvement than was shown by the
ordinary insurance experience. See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE TO STUDY
THE NEED FOR A NEW MORTALITY TABLE AND RELATED TOPICS 91 (June 21, 1939) (observing that
“mortality on colored lives improved considerably during the thirteen year period, but it remained at
approximately the same level as compared to white industrial mortality, for the latter improved also,” and
reporting that “[c]olored mortality averaged 83% higher than white, but at the important insurance ages
between 10 and 40 it was well over twice as high”). Id.
158
Also see the discussion of pressures by civil rights groups on their “ordinary” insurance divisions infra
at Part III.D.
159
Report of Henry M. McKiven, Ph.D., Norflet v. John Hancock Financial Services Inc. and John
Hancock Life Insurance Co., No. 04-1099 (D. Conn. Jan. 29, 2007) (rulings on motion to compel
discovery). McKiven cites an article in the Amsterdam News dated April 26, 1947, reporting that the union
demanded that insurance be sold to “colored applicants on the basis of their insurability without restrictions
on the grounds of color” and that “agents be compensated for the sale of insurance to colored applicants on
the same basis as for the sale of insurance to white applicants.” Id.
160
See N.Y. INS. DEP’T, REPORT ON EXAMINATION OF METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
REGARDING RESPONSE TO SUPPLEMENT NO. 1 TO CIRCULAR LETTER NO. 19, at 16–17 (Mar. 1, 2002)
[hereinafter N.Y. INS. DEP’T, REPORT ON METROPOLITAN LIFE].
161
Id. at 17.
162
MCGILL, supra note 153, at 160.
163
Id. at 160–61.
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In its report to the National Association of Insurance Commissioners on the
development of the proposed new table,164 the industry advisory committee noted the
difficulty of determining suitable margins when developing a valuation table for general
use throughout the country.165 The report observed that it had been common practice in
the past to price policies by race.166 However, the report also noted “a greater tendency”
to depart from past practice:
In the past, it has been common practice to use substandard rates and
values for non-white lives, and many companies still follow this practice.
While the evidence which your Committee has developed demonstrates
conclusively an improvement in Industrial Mortality on standard lives
over the past twenty-five years, there is a greater tendency for companies
to use the same policy forms, valuation and non-forfeiture bases, etc., for
non-white as for white business and, in many companies, there is an
increasing proportion of Industrial business written on non-white lives. It
is conceivable, therefore, that Industrial mortality, overall, in the future
may not improve but may, in fact, become higher. In their deliberations
on the appropriate level of loading, the Committee, therefore gave some
consideration as to what the level of mortality in the valuation table should
be to cover experience of the companies on all of their Industrial business,
white and non-white combined.167

164

REPORT OF THE INDUSTRY ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE INDUSTRIAL MORTALITY TABLE
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE N.A.I.C., in 2 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE
COMMISSIONERS, 92ND ANNUAL MEETING 521–43 (1961) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE INDUSTRY
ADVISORY COMMITTEE] (noting that “[i]n Executive Session it was voted to accept the report and postpone
any action until the December [1961] meeting,” so that there would be “ample opportunity for the
companies to study the report, and for adequate discussion by the Actuaries”). The Superintendent of
Insurance for the State of New York and Chair of the Industrial Table Study Subcommittee of the Life
Insurance Committee of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Thomas Thacher, appointed
an Industry Advisory Committee of company actuaries to work with the technicians of the insurance
departments to develop a modern mortality table to replace the 1941 Commissioners Standard Industrial
Mortality Table. The Industry Advisory Committee was comprised of actuaries from six life insurance
companies, including the Colonial Life Insurance Company of America, the National Life and Accident
Insurance Company, the American National Insurance Company, the Commonwealth Life Insurance
Company, the Life Insurance Company of Georgia, and the Western and Southern Life Insurance
Company. See INDUSTRIAL MORTALITY TABLE STUDY SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, in 2 PROCEEDINGS OF THE
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS, 91ST ANNUAL MEETING 535 (1960) (reporting on
the formation and membership of the Industry Advisory Committee and on the plans for the project agreed
upon at a meeting attended by members of the Industry Advisory Committee and of the Technicians’
Committee, comprised of representatives of the Insurance Departments of California, Nebraska, New
Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania).
165
REPORT OF THE INDUSTRY ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 164, at 525.
166
Id.
167
Id. See also William C. Brown, A Proposed New Industrial Valuation Table, 13 TRANSACTIONS OF
SOC’Y OF ACTUARIES 457 (1960), available at http://www.soa.org/library/research/transactions-of-societyof-actuaries/1961/january/tsa61v13pt1n37ab27.pdf. The Industry Advisory Committee collected
information from all industrial companies with at least $50 million of outstanding life insurance in force in
1958, including data on the proportions of nonwhite and female business. Id. at 457. The industry
committee assumed that if business were issued on a “substandard” basis, a different valuation table could
be used with the permission of state authorities, and thus, a separate “substandard” table need not be
prepared. Id. at 469–70.
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¶53

Although industrial insurance remained an important form of insurance for private
insurance companies at least into the 1950s,168 the industrial business began to decline
thereafter.169 In the first half of the twentieth century, the increased wages of workers led
to an expanding market of potential policyholders as well as a gradual merging of the
industrial and group insurance markets.170 Thus, companies increasingly aimed their
marketing efforts at members of the middle class.171
¶54
As incomes of workers increased, they could more often afford to purchase
intermediate, ordinary, or other forms of insurance that provided greater coverage than
industrial policies.172 By the late 1960s, Metropolitan, Prudential, and John Hancock,
formerly known as the “Big Three,” had discontinued writing new industrial policies,173
and held only about thirty percent of the industrial insurance in force at the end of
1970.174 Of the remaining companies selling industrial insurance, as well as ordinary life
insurance, most were located and principally operated in the southeast United States.175
Of the companies selling industrial insurance exclusively, many were located in
Louisiana because of specific provision under Louisiana state law for the operation of
burial insurance and industrial companies.176
¶55
Civil rights litigation in Louisiana,177 involving nearly three hundred companies
that sold industrial policies over a fifty to sixty-five year period during the twentieth
century,178 reveals the continuing impact of prior race-based practices in the industrial
insurance market.179 Although facts that developed in the course of the litigation indicate
168
In 1948, it was estimated that of the seventy-eight million insurance policyholders in the United States,
about two-thirds of them owned industrial policies. Malvin E. Davis, Modern Industrial Life Insurance, in
LIFE INSURANCE TRENDS AT MID-CENTURY 115 (David McCahan ed., 1950).
169
MCGILL, supra note 153, at 715–16.
170
See, e.g., id. at 715.
171
Id.
172
MARSHALL & ZUBAY, supra note 97, at 23. By that time, the “Big Three” industrial companies had been
selling ordinary insurance for many years. See KELLER, supra note 47, at 20–21 (noting that “Prudential
created an ordinary insurance branch in 1886 which did 3 percent of the company’s business in 1890 and
37 percent by 1905,” that Metropolitan revived its ordinary business in 1892, and that John Hancock did so
in 1902).
173
MARSHALL & ZUBAY, supra note 97, at 23–24.
174
Id. at 33.
175
Id. at 39.
176
Id. at 28, 34 n.5. Of 161 companies reporting industrial insurance policies in force at the end of 1970,
only 10 for which information was available wrote industrial policies exclusively. Id. at 34.
177
See In re Monumental Life Ins. Co., 365 F.3d 408 (5th Cir. 2004) (class certification issue), cert. denied,
125 S.Ct. 277 (2004). The NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund has participated in the litigation as
amicus curiae.
178
Three insurance companies are defendants in the consolidated litigation. Over the years, each of the
companies acquired other companies and assumed blocks of in-force insurance issued by them. The
Judicial Panel for Multidistrict Litigation consolidated the actions against the insurance companies and
transferred them to the Eastern District of Louisiana for pretrial proceedings. Id. at 412.
179
The Fifth Circuit opinion in Monumental Life Ins. Co. reversed and remanded the district court’s denial
of plaintiffs’ motion to certify a class pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). Id. at 421. The plaintiffs sought
certification of a class comprised of “all African-Americans who own, or owned at the time of policy
termination, an industrial life insurance policy that was issued as a substandard plan or at a substandard
rate.” Id. at 413. The plaintiffs limited the class to “industrial policies sold at a substandard (i.e., higher)
rate for African-Americans and a lower rate for Caucasians, or as a substandard plan (i.e., a more costly
plan) for African-Americans and a corresponding less expensive plan for Caucasians.” Id. at 414.
Plaintiffs define industrial life insurance policies as “(1) policies labeled as ‘industrial’ or (2) those policies
with a face amount of less than $2,000.00 and weekly or month home premium collection.” Id.
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that none of the companies sold policies with race-based premiums or race-based benefits
after the early 1970s,180 many older policies still remained in force.181 Beginning in
1988, some insurers voluntarily adjusted premiums and/or benefits to equalize the
amount of coverage per premium dollar, but some policies were terminated without
adjustment, and other existing policies were not adjusted.182 Some policies sold in the
Jim Crow era containing racially unequal premiums or benefits thus remained in force in
the twenty-first century.
¶56
During the last decade, certain states have required disclosure of historical racebased practices of companies licensed to do business in their states.183 Although some
states have focused their investigations on slavery-era practices, other state regulators,
including the New York State Insurance Department, have required disclosure of postslavery and twentieth century practices.184 Following those disclosures and follow-up
investigations, several major life insurers, including Metropolitan and Prudential, settled
class action lawsuits alleging racially discriminatory past practices in the industrial
insurance market.185
C. Black Self-Help After the Civil War
¶57

As the race-based policies of white insurance companies186 in the late nineteenth
century evolved, black fraternal and benevolent societies187 added insurance features to
their benefit programs.188 This section describes the development of an innovative
fraternal insurance program189 that led to development of a major black insurance
180

Other cases have involved race-based practices that were discontinued as late as the year 2000. See,
e.g., Thorn v. Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. Co., 445 F.3d 311 (4th Cir. 2006) (affirming denial of class
certification of approximately 1.4 million African-American policyholders).
181
The number of policies in force is in dispute. The plaintiffs in Monumental Life Ins. Co. estimated that
over 4.5 million of the 5.6 million industrial policies issued by defendants remained in force; many other
policies have been terminated, surrendered, or paid-up without remediation. 365 F.3d at 416. However,
defendants’ expert estimated that the ratio of terminated policies to outstanding policies is approximately
five-to-one, leaving slightly more than one million policies remaining in force. Id.
182
Plaintiffs claimed violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982, and sought the following relief: 1) an
injunction prohibiting the collection of discriminatory premiums; 2) reformation of policies to equalize
benefits; and 3) restitution of past premium overcharges or benefit underpayments. In re Monumental Life
Ins. Co., 365 F.3d at 412–13.
183
See discussion supra Parts I, II, particularly at notes 9 and 46. As described in greater detail there, some
disclosures by companies have been required under state law (slavery-era registers). Some state insurance
departments have conducted investigations of individual companies under procedures established by a
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) working group on race-based premiums
following the results of a survey of life insurers published by NAIC in 1988.
184
See discussion supra Parts I, II.
185
See supra note 4.
186
See discussion supra Part III.B. By the early part of the twentieth century, as reported by Louis
Brandeis, about ninety-four percent of all industrial insurance in the United States was furnished by three
companies: Metropolitan of New York at forty-nine percent, Prudential of New Jersey at thirty-six percent,
and John Hancock of Massachusetts at nine percent. Each company also issued ordinary life policies.
Brandeis, supra note 62, at 313.
187
A mutual benefit (benevolent) society could evolve into a fraternal society, which tended to have rituals
and a broader membership base. FAHEY, supra note 98, at 5 (noting that in the late nineteenth century most
fraternal societies provided life insurance).
188
See Reid, supra note 83, at 40–42.
189
See generally KELLER, supra note 47, at 10–11 (explaining that “the great age of the fraternals began in
the 1870’s [sic], and they grew with the ensuing decades of industrialization and immigration until by 1895
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company. It focuses on the story of one fraternal organization as an example of the type
of economic and racial dynamics that led to significant segregation of markets during the
Jim Crow era.
1. Black Fraternal and Benevolent Societies
¶58

One of the largest and most successful black benevolent organizations, the Grand
Fountain, United Order of the True Reformers (hereinafter “True Reformers”), was
formed in 1881, and headquartered in Richmond, Virginia.190 The True Reformers,
described by Booker T. Washington as “one of the first large secret orders formed by
Negroes,”191 and by W.E.B. Du Bois as “probably the most remarkable Negro
organization in the country,”192 established an extensive insurance program.193 Between
its founding and the year it failed, its lodges paid out to its members nearly three million
dollars in sick and death benefits.194
¶59
Organized by a former slave named William Washington Browne,195 the True
Reformers developed out of Browne’s involvement with a group associated with the
Independent Order of Good Templars, a fraternal organization known for its promotion
of temperance and prohibition.196 Through this association with the Good Templars,
Browne became aware of the benefits, such as burial and life insurance, provided to the
members of white fraternal organizations. During the 1870s, there was a growing
division within the Good Templars regarding racial integration of the organization.197
their insurance in force surpassed that of the regular life companies,” but their very nature prevented
individual societies from attaining any considerable size because their “essence was exclusivity” or
“protection from the surrounding milieu,” while regular life insurance companies provided “an adaptation
to an urban, industrial society”).
190
E.g., James D. Watkinson, William Washington Browne and the True Reformers of Richmond, Virginia,
97 VA. MAG. OF HIST. AND BIOGRAPHY 375 (1989); C.G. Woodson, Insurance Business Among Negroes,
14 J. OF NEGRO HIST. 202, 206 (1929).
191
BOOKER T. WASHINGTON, THE NEGRO IN BUSINESS 162 (1907).
192
ATLANTA UNIVERSITY, ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AMOUNG NEGRO AMERICANS 101 (W.E.B. Du Bois
ed., 1907).
193
FRAZIER, supra note 96, at 397–98.
194
Reid, supra note 83, at 40.
195
Browne was born in 1849 and died in 1897. The seventh son of field slaves who had been purchased in
Virginia, Browne became a house servant in Georgia, a companion of his first owner’s son. He later was
hired out, first to a shopkeeper and then to an attorney. Browne escaped while in his early teens, and made
his way to Union troops in Memphis, where he became an officer’s servant. When he discovered that
Union forces surrendered escaped slaves at the request of slave owners, he left Memphis and worked at
various jobs until he found farm work in Wisconsin, where he had learned that he could attend school. In
1864, he joined a Union infantry division as a paid substitute and served until 1866. He returned to
Wisconsin to continue his schooling and in September 1869, he traveled to Georgia to visit his mother. He
studied for the ministry in Atlanta, worked as a schoolteacher in Georgia and Alabama, spoke out against
the Ku Klux Klan, and in 1876, was ordained a minister in the Colored (later Christian) Methodist Church.
When the bishop of the Colored Methodist Church demanded that he give up his True Reformer work,
Browne became a minister in the African Methodist Episcopal Church, but never held a pastorate. FAHEY,
supra note 98, at 14–15, 17.
196
It was also known for its universalism. The Independent Order of Good Templars accepted women as
members with full rights to hold office, and also accepted an occasional black member in the North. In
addition, the Order avoided any mandatory insurance program that might prevent the membership of the
poor, the old, or the sickly. Id. at 13.
197
Id. (explaining that the division came from differing racial views of members in the southern states and
of those overseas, especially those in England and Scotland).
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The American lodges resisted integration,198 and by 1876, Browne had organized an
Alabama branch of the all-black True Reformers.199 After accepting an invitation in 1880
to become leader of the True Reformers organization in Virginia, Browne settled in
Richmond, Virginia.200
¶60
Under Browne’s leadership, and that of his successor, W.L. Taylor, the True
Reformers expanded greatly. By 1903, according to contemporary reports, there were
2097 Fountains across the country and 269 employees.201 Seven years later, the
membership roll of the True Reformers had grown to over 50,000, and the organization
could be found in over twenty states.202 The organization established its own bank, the
True Reformers’ Savings Bank of Richmond, Virginia.203 It also operated its own
newspaper,204 old-age home,205 retail stores,206 a 150 room hotel,207 and developed land
for an all-black community in Richmond called Brownesville.208
¶61
Recognizing the difficulties blacks encountered with white insurance companies,
Browne sought to provide insurance coverage to members, including policies that would
provide relief to beneficiaries and cover burial costs.209 Utilizing mainstream financial
practices in insurance and other businesses, he initiated several important innovations.
198
Id. at 13–14. Later, American fraternal orders and lodges also resisted imitation by black orders. Some
fraternal orders sued, with mixed success, their black counterparts seeking to enjoin the black orders from
practicing such imitation. See CHARLES S. MAGNUM, JR., THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE NEGRO 75–76
(Johnson Reprint Corp 1940) (collecting cases). In 1909, the governor of Georgia signed a bill that forbid
the “use by Negro Secret Societies of the insignia, ritualistic work, grips, etc. of orders composed of
whites.” JOHN DITTMER, BLACK GEORGIA IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA, 1900–1920, at 56 (1977).
199
Watkinson, supra note 190, at 376 (the Grand Lodge of Good Templars offered Browne a charter and
sponsorship under a separate name, the United Order of True Reformers).
200
FAHEY, supra note 98, at 16.
201
W.P. BURRELL & D.E. JOHNSON, TWENTY-FIVE YEARS HISTORY OF THE GRAND FOUNTAIN OF THE
UNITED ORDER OF THE TRUE REFORMERS 315, 319 (1909).
202
By 1909, the True Reformers had “60,000 men and women paying dues of from fifty-five to sixty cents
per month; 15,000 men and women [in the Classes] paying from $1.20 to $2.85 cents each, every quarter,
and 20,000 children paying sixteen cents per month, each.” FAHEY, supra note 98, at 38.
203
The Saving Bank of the Grand Fountain, United Order of True Reformers, which was established by an
Act of Virginia’s General Assembly in 1888, was the first black-owned, black-operated bank to be
chartered in the United States. Watkinson, supra note 190, at 386 (noting, however, that a bank in the
District of Columbia was the first such bank to begin operations).
204
FRAZIER, supra note 96, at 373 (stating that The Reformer had a weekly circulation of approximately
8000 subscribers by 1900).
205
The Old Folks Home, built on 634 acres purchased in Westham in the west end of Richmond, was
incorporated in 1898. Watkinson, supra note 190, at 392.
206
In 1899, the Reformers obtained a charter for the Reformers’ Mercantile and Industrial Association,
which permitted it to establish stores, build and operate a hotel, carry on a printing and newspaper business,
and deal in real estate as a former companying, bringing “under one roof the workings of the real estate
department, the The Reformer offices and printing department, and the regalia department.” Watkinson,
supra note 190, at 394. The Association opened its first store in Richmond in 1900, with others added later
in Virginia and in Washington. FAHEY, supra note 98, at 30.
207
FAHEY, supra note 98, at 21 (located in Richmond, the hotel also served in part as a boarding house for
True Reformer employees).
208
David T. Beito, To Advance the “Practice of Thrift and Economy”: Fraternal Societies and Social
Capital, 1890–1920, 29 J. OF INTERDISC. HIST. 585, 603 (1999). Between 1899 and 1902, about 200 acres
of the Westham property was divided into 130 small lots to support the home and create a black settlement
that was connected by an electric streetcar with Richmond. FAHEY, supra note 98, at 30. When segregated
streetcars were introduced in 1904, True Reformers helped lead protests in the black community and
several protest meetings took place in True Reformers’ Hall. Id.
209
FAHEY, supra note 98, at 17.
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Soon after its formation, the True Reformers became the first black benevolent society to
disburse insurance benefits through a national office.210 He also instituted a sliding scale
for insurance policies dependent upon the age and premium paid by the policyholder.211
When the True Reformers began this practice in 1885, it was customary for such
organizations to charge everyone below the maximum age for membership the same
premium or assessment regardless of age or risk.212 The True Reformers would later
require applicants to take a medical questionnaire and, in some cases, undergo a medical
examination.213
¶62
Although the True Reformers developed their insurance program into one of the
most advanced enterprises of its kind undertaken by a black benevolent society, the
revenues earned by the organization from its insurance policies also played a role in the
financial collapse of the organization. The money collected for insurance was used,
through the bank, to finance other business enterprises that the Order managed.214
Through a combination of unprofitable investments, poor recordkeeping, and poor
management by officials of the bank, the True Reformers Savings Bank became bankrupt
in 1910, and a court ordered the directors of the bank to close in late October of that
year.215
¶63
After the savings bank was ordered to close, the insurance commissioner barred
the organization from accepting any new members in the state.216 Although the insurance
commissioner reissued the True Reformers an insurance license in April of 1911, the
organization could not overcome the problems it faced following the bank’s
bankruptcy.217 The True Reformers never regained its earlier prominence. Membership
declined dramatically in 1911; by 1912, there were only five thousand members, and
after the Great Depression, it became virtually nonexistent.218 Its legacy survived,
however, through the influence of many of its former employees, including Richmond’s
Maggie L. Walker,219 who used the skills and vision she developed with the True
210

Beito, supra note 208, at 602.
Id. See also BRYSON, supra note 134, at 8 (1948) (observing, however, that the True Reformers used a
mortality table which was actuarially unsound). The True Reformers also were one of the first benevolent
organizations to have a children’s section within the organization. By paying monthly dues for
membership in the Rosebud Nursery, children could become eligible for sickness and burial insurance. By
1906, there were nearly 15,000 children on the Rosebud Nursery’s membership roster. Beito, supra note
208, at 603–04.
212
FAHEY, supra note 98, at 16–17.
213
Id. at 19.
214
Id. at 32.
215
Id. at 33. The organization made unsecured loans to many True Reformer business projects. When the
businesses defaulted on loan payments, the bank could not pay claims brought against insurance policies
issued by the order. Watkinson, supra note 190, at 396.
216
FAHEY, supra note 98, at 34.
217
The order issued insurance until 1934, when its name no longer appeared in state insurance records. See
Watkinson, supra note 190, at 396.
218
FAHEY, supra note 98, at 37.
219
Walker often referred to the True Reformers as the model for the Independent Order of Saint Luke,
which she led from 1899, after leaving the employ of the True Reformers, until her death in 1934. The
Order established a children’s auxiliary, which grew to over 15,000 by the 1920s, to provide insurance for
children. In addition, under her leadership, the Order established a number of other businesses, including a
newspaper, a department store, and in 1903, the Saint Luke Penny Savings Bank. Although the Order
severed ties to the bank in 1911 because of state laws, it continued as the renamed Consolidated Bank and
Trust Company of Richmond, Virginia. In 1998, it ranked as the thirteenth largest black-owned bank, with
assets exceeding $100 million. Beito, supra note 208, at 607, 612 (citing the Black Enterprise for
211
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Reformers to create other black businesses and insurance enterprises during the Jim Crow
era.220
2. Black Life Insurance Companies
¶64

In the section of An American Dilemma dealing with economics and finance,
Myrdal observed that black businesses tended to operate in highly race-segregated
markets, and that many insurance companies were founded by blacks in response to race
discrimination by white insurance companies.221
¶65
During the period between 1880 and 1910, many insurance companies founded by
blacks began selling insurance in the South and in urban areas with large AfricanAmerican communities.222 At least initially, they operated under fraternal assessment
and mutual benefit charters, which had smaller initial capital requirements than those of
legal reserve companies.223
¶66
Black-owned companies faced difficulty in attracting capital, in part due to the
negative effect of Hoffman’s 1896 book, Race Traits and Tendencies of the American
Negro.224 Later, some of these companies were converted to legal reserve companies. In
other cases, officers and employees of these early relatively unregulated and
undercapitalized companies left them to found legal reserve companies.225 These early
companies built on the earlier experiences and traditions of black fraternal and
benevolent societies, especially those of the True Reformers.226
¶67
Several former True Reformers founded and became presidents of some of the
most successful black insurance companies that emerged in the first half of the twentieth
century.227 For example, North Carolina Mutual, the nation’s oldest black insurance
company, was founded in 1898 as an assessment association by former True Reformers
John Merrick and A.M. Moore,228 and converted to a legal reserve life insurance
information on the Consolidated Bank and Trust Company).
220
Id.
221
MYRDAL, supra note 2, at 316.
222
See id.
223
BRYSON, supra note 134, at 7. Legal reserve life insurance companies “agree to pay a stipulated benefit,
collect prescribed rates therefore, and by law maintain a reserve for each policy.” CLOUGH, supra note 51,
at 3 n.1. Level premiums “made necessary an invested reserve fund” to compensate for the decline in the
insured’s life expectancy. KELLER, supra note 47, at 60. The main variables in calculating a reserve
included the proportion of the premium to be charged against the reserve, the assumed mortality rate, and
the interest that the reserve would be expected to earn. Id. at 60–62 (describing the state regulatory
requirements for life insurance reserves during 1858–1905).
224
BRYSON, supra note 134, at 7; see also Joseph A. Pierce, The Evolution of Negro Business, in BLACK
BUSINESS ENTERPRISE: HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES 25, 32 (Ronald W. Bailey ed.,
1971). See also discussion supra at Part III.B.3.
225
BRYSON, supra note 134, at 7.
226
JOHN SIBLEY BUTLER, ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND SELF-HELP AMONG BLACK AMERICANS: A
RECONSIDERATION OF RACE AND ECONOMICS 119 (rev. ed. 2005) (“[I]f one were to choose a secret society
which had a direct impact on the establishment of Afro-American insurance, it would be the Grand United
Order of the True Reformers . . . .”).
227
For example, former True Reformers either founded or became leaders of the North Carolina Mutual
Life Insurance Company, the National Benefit Life Insurance Company, the American Beneficial Insurance
Company, the Southern Aid Society, the Richmond Beneficial and Insurance Company, and the American
Beneficial Insurance Company. FAHEY, supra note 98, at 22; see also Beito, supra note 208, at 606.
228
WILLIAM JESSE KENNEDY, THE NORTH CAROLINA MUTUAL STORY: A SYMBOL OF PROGRESS 1898–
1970, at 1–6 (1970).
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company in 1913.229 North Carolina Mutual weathered the Great Depression, a time
when many insurance companies failed, and at the beginning of the twenty-first century
was licensed to do business in twenty-four states and the District of Columbia, with over
$12 billion of insurance policies in force.230
¶68
Myrdal reported that in 1939, there were sixty-seven black-founded insurance
companies that had survived the Great Depression, giving employment to about eight
thousand workers.231 However, he concluded that it was “difficult to see a real future for
a segregated Negro financial system,” and that it was a “poor substitute” for what was
really needed—employment in white-dominated financial institutions and “more
consideration for them as insurance or credit seekers.”232
¶69
By the late 1960s, the forty-six company members of the National Insurance
Association (formerly the National Negro Insurance Association)233 employed twelve
thousand workers, including eight thousand agents.234 They “had assets of $418 million,
insurance in force of $2,330 billion, and a premium income in excess of $115 million.”235
As insurance markets became more integrated following the Civil Rights Movement,
however, black companies encountered increasing competitive pressures from white
companies in the products offered to their traditional customer base, as well as work

229

BRYSON, supra note 134, at 13 tbl.3.
North Carolina Mutual Life Insurance Company,
http://www.ncmutuallife.com/newsite/pages/about.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2009). For discussion of the
role played by sales agents and headquarters staff in the North Carolina Mutual Life Insurance Company
and other black financial businesses after 1880, see, for example, Angel Kwolek-Folland, The African
American Financial Industries: Issues of Class, Race and Gender in the early 20th Century, 23 BUS. &
ECON. HIST. 85, 85–107 (1994).
231
MYRDAL, supra note 2, at 317, 1263 (stating that the modern history of that business centered around
four institutions, the North Carolina Mutual Life Insurance Company of Durham founded in 1898, the
Standard Life Insurance Company of Atlanta organized in 1913 and dissolved in the 1920s, the National
Benefit Life Insurance Company of Washington, D.C., which failed in 1931, and the Supreme Liberty Life
Insurance Company of Chicago); see also, e.g., ALEXA BENSON HENDERSON, ATLANTA LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY: GUARDIAN OF BLACK ECONOMIC DIGNITY (1990); Robert Christian Puth, Supreme Life: The
History of a Negro Life Insurance Company (Aug. 1967) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern
University) (on file with the Northwestern University Library).
232
MYRDAL, supra note 2, at 318.
233
The National Negro Insurance Association was founded in 1921 in Durham, North Carolina, by leaders
of black-owned insurance companies to encourage, foster, and stimulate the business of insurance. In
addition to the member companies, the Association reported in the late 1960s that there were at least seven
other Negro life companies and a number of fraternal benefit associations that provide life insurance for
their members. The major life insurance company members in the late sixties included North Carolina
Mutual Life Insurance Company, the largest member of the Association, as well as Golden State Mutual
Life Insurance Company, Los Angeles; Supreme Life Insurance Company of America, Chicago; Atlanta
Life Insurance Company, Atlanta; and Universal Life Insurance Company, Memphis, Tennessee.
FLETCHER, supra note 96, at 128–29, 128 n.15. In 1978, the Association’s roster reported only thirty-six
member companies and four other non-member minority insurance companies. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, DISCRIMINATION AGAINST MINORITIES AND WOMEN IN PENSIONS AND HEALTH, LIFE, AND
DISABILITY INSURANCE, VOL. II: EXHIBITS, Exhibit No. 12, at 1145–73 (1978) (letter of May 5, 1978 from
Chris H. Howard, Associate Director, National Insurance Association, National Insurance Association 1978
Member Roster).
234
FLETCHER, supra note 96, at 128.
235
Id. By comparison, in 1945, the 44 member companies of the National Negro Insurance Association
had an aggregate of over 3.9 million policies in force, “of which 232,441 were ordinary policies, and [3.8
million] were industrial or health and accident policies. The average size of ordinary policies was $690 and
the median size of all industrial contracts was $140.28.” Id. at 126–27.
230
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opportunities available to their workforce. Black companies thus sought new customers
and business, including group life coverage sold to employers.
¶70
A study of black insurance companies, published in 1970, noted that black firms
were major targets for white insurers; white firms were “anxious to increase their ratio of
Negro employees”236 and “capture the Negro market.”237 The study concluded that “the
combined effect of these two events will ultimately have an impact—and probably
detrimental—on those Negro firms that have pioneered in developing both the Negro life
insurance market and employment skills and opportunities among black employees.”238
¶71
By 1979, black insurance companies had responded to changes in the marketplace
by yielding the relatively small market for black ordinary insurance to big companies
with superior marketing capabilities and by concentrating their activities on the larger
market segment of home service and industrial insurance business that the big companies
had abandoned.239 At that time, only three out of the forty or so remaining minority life
insurance companies sold ordinary insurance exclusively; they were small companies or
confined primarily to a single state market.240
¶72
At the end of the twentieth century, when an executive of a black insurance
company predicted that in ten years, “only five African American-owned insurance firms
will remain” and the rest will die or merge with other National Insurance Association
members,241 Myrdal’s prediction of a limited future for a segregated financial system had
largely come to pass.
D. Ordinary and Intermediate Life Insurance: Race-Based Rates, Restrictions
¶73

Race-based rates did not generally arise in the intermediate242 or ordinary life
insurance market243 until the twentieth century, when companies like Metropolitan
236

Id. at 129. In 1969, one white-owned insurance company hired nearly five hundred black sales
representatives, a number twice as great as the number of employees hired that year by all black-owned
insurance companies combined. Jacob M. Duker & Charles E. Hughes, The Black-Owned Life Insurance
Company: Issues and Recommendations, 40 J. RISK & INS. 221, 228 (1973).
237
FLETCHER, supra note 96, at 129.
238
Id.
239
Debit Life Insurance Industry: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopoly, and Business
Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. app. at 233, 237 (Mar. 12 and 16, 1979) (statement of the
National Insurance Association).
240
Id. at 238.
241
Frank McCoy, Life Sustaining Measures, BLACK ENTERPRISE, June 1998, at X, 182 (quoting Larkin
Teasley, the CEO of Golden State Mutual, and noting that in the late 1990s, Gold State Mutual started
pursuing the Latino market); see also Jeffrey McKinney, Bold Players New Strategies 33rd Annual Report
on Black Business: Holding Their Ground, BLACK ENTERPRISE, June 2005, at x (noting that companies like
North Carolina Mutual are “adopting plans to buy other companies, sell products more aggressively to win
affluent customers, and exit money-losing businesses”).
In addition, some minority insurance companies merged with major white insurance companies. For
example, United Mutual, which formed as a fraternal organization in 1933 and converted to a mutual life
insurance company in 1945, merged with Metlife in 1992. In 2002, the New York Insurance Department
examined available surviving United Mutual records from 1937 to 1980, as well as several hundred
application files from both their industrial and ordinary departments. Among the 203 files from which the
race of the policyholder could be determined, only eight were other than African-American and the
“premiums each was charged was consistent with the premiums charged to similarly situated AfricanAmericans.” See NY INS. DEPT., REPORT ON METROPOLITAN LIFE, supra note 160, at 12, 26 (finding no
race distinct underwriting practices).
242
Intermediate policies are a cross between industrial and ordinary insurance. S.S. HUEBNER, LIFE
INSURANCE 322–23 (4th ed. 1950) (For example, “[i]n 1927 one large company introduced industrial
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noticed that the proportion of black lives in the intermediate branch “had grown to a point
where the over-all mortality of the group was being raised significantly.”244 The same
general approach as in the industrial branch was applied in 1930, but discontinued at the
beginning of 1935.245 At that time, a simpler rule was adopted under which the excess
mortality was offset by paying only partial commissions on policies issued to blacks.246
¶74
In 1935, the New York anti-discrimination law was amended to disallow any
distinction due to race in the amount of commissions paid for writing the policy.247 In
response, Metropolitan reacted the same way it did in its industrial business when
Massachusetts passed a law prohibiting race-based premiums in 1884:248 It discontinued
soliciting black customers for any kind of life insurance in New York.249 The black press
in New York ran a series of articles complaining about Metropolitan’s refusal to sell
blacks its full range of products,250 and the New York Temporary Commission on the
Condition of the Urban Colored Population announced that it planned to investigate
Metropolitan and other companies for alleged “discriminatory practices against
Negroes.”251 Outside of New York, the company continued to maintain its dual racebased commission structure,252 explaining that “where possible” the company had tried to
insure black lives but “at rates commensurate with mortality experience.”253
insurance on a monthly plan, the size of policies ranging from $500 to $800.”).
243
Prudential established its ordinary insurance branch in 1886, and by the end of 1890, was selling more
than two thousand ordinary policies a year. WILLIAM H. A. CARR, FROM THREE CENTS A WEEK. . . : THE
STORY OF THE PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA 40 (1975). In the late nineteenth century,
the “Big Three” companies selling ordinary life insurance were the Mutual Life Insurance Company, the
Equitable Life Assurance Society, and the New York Life Insurance Company. KELLER, supra note 47, at
12–13. By the turn of the century, Prudential and Metropolitan had rapidly growing ordinary and
intermediate life insurance departments “which appealed with great success to a lower middle class market
untouched by the Big Three.” Id. at 14.
244
JAMES, supra note 112, at 339 (beginning in the 1920s). In its examination of Metropolitan’s race-based
underwriting practices, the New York Insurance Department found that among the policyholders in the
1920s whose race could be determined, about eighty-two percent of whites received ordinary policies and
seventeen percent received intermediate policies. In contrast, twelve percent of blacks received ordinary
policies and eighty-eight percent received intermediate policies. After analyzing a sample of application
files, the examiner concluded that the company classified black applicants seeking policies by the ordinary
department as “intermediate” based on race. See NYS INS. DEPT., REPORT ON METROPOLITAN LIFE, supra
note 160, at 15.
245
JAMES, supra note 112, at 339.
246
Id.
247
N.Y. CONSOL. LAWS ch. 30, §90 (Cahill 1930), amended by N.Y. Laws of 1935, ch. 736 (1931–35
cumulative supplement) (providing that “[n]o life insurance corporation doing business in this state shall
reject any application for a policy of life insurance issued and sold by it, or refuse to issue such policy after
proper application therefore, nor shall any lower rate be fixed or discrimination made by it in the fees or
commissions of its agents for writing such policy, solely by reason of the applicant being wholly or
partially of African descent,” and providing for a fine of one thousand dollars for violation of the
provision).
248
See discussion supra Part III.B.2.
249
JAMES, supra note 112, at 339.
250
Report of Henry M. McKiven, Ph.D., Norflet v. John Hancock Financial Services Inc. and John
Hancock Life Insurance Co., No. 04-1099 (D. Conn. Jan. 29, 2007) (rulings on motion to compel
discovery, citing articles from the Amsterdam News on September 24 and July 23, 1938, and on January 28
and November 11, 1939, and from the New York Age on September 24 and October 15, 1938, and February
28, 1939).
251
Id.
252
See NYS INS. DEPT., REPORT ON METROPOLITAN LIFE, supra note 160, at 22 (finding that from 1935
through at least 1949, agents outside New York received twenty percent of full scale commissions on
ordinary policies issued to African-Americans, and agents received no issue credit and no first-year
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¶75

In 1938, when a black policyholder in Brooklyn complained to Metropolitan and
the NAACP that he was unable to buy additional insurance from his neighborhood
insurance representative, the company explained by letter to the policyholder that “in
New York we have found it necessary to assign the collection of colored debits to
collectors who are not authorized to sell life insurance to any one, regardless of color”
and that “the only change in our practice in New York is that we do not actively solicit
applications for insurance from colored persons.”254 However, the letter continued,
“[s]uch persons may apply at one of our district offices, of which there are a large
number conveniently located, and they will receive fair and courteous treatment when
they so apply.”255
¶76
Shortly thereafter, the NAACP issued a press release reporting that Metropolitan,
which had “written millions upon millions of dollars of insurance upon Negroes in this
country,” had ceased to solicit business from blacks in New York,256 and publicized the
company’s statement that applications for such business would be accepted at the
company’s district offices.257
¶77
The NAACP was also receiving complaints about discrimination against blacks
with regard to other types of insurance coverage, including automobile insurance.258
Although the NAACP compiled information and urged investigation of such practices by
state agencies, it did not challenge them through litigation. As Thurgood Marshall
explained in a letter to Roger Baldwin of the American Civil Liberties Union259 when
Travelers insurance company had denied Marshall auto insurance coverage, the company
stated that this was because he lived “in a ‘congested area,’ meaning Harlem, and ‘not’

commissions for intermediate policies issued to African-Americans).
253
JAMES, supra note 112, at 339.
254
Letter from Charles J. Taylor, Jr., Second Vice President, The Metropolitan Life Insurance Company,
New York City, to Z. Marshall Cochrane of Brooklyn, New York, July 27, 1938 (from NAACP files,
reproduced from the Collections of the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress) (explaining that the
change in the company's practice was due to legislation enacted in 1935, which was "introduced and
sponsored by Assemblyman Stephens of New York City, a colored man").
255
Id.
256
Press Release, NAACP, Metropolitan Life Not Seeking Negro Business in New York State, Anti-Jim
Crow Law Cited by Company as Reason for Its Failure to Permit Agents to Solicit New Policies; Prospects
Must Apply at Company Offices (Sept. 16, 1938) [hereinafter NAACP Press Release] (from NAACP files,
reproduced from the Collections of the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress). The NAACP's press
release explained the 1935 legislation as follows: “It has been known for years that some insurance
companies have refused to sell certain types of policies to Negroes, no matter how qualified Negroes might
be to purchase the same. It was this policy which prompted Assemblyman Stephens to sponsor his law in
the 1935 legislature outlawing jim crow treatment.” Id. See also supra note 254.
257
The press release also observed as follows: “The N.A.A.C.P. so far has had no complaints about
treatment of colored people who apply to district offices. It is not known whether they are having any extra
difficulty securing the same types of policies as are issued to whites.” NAACP Press Release, supra note
256.
258
See Confidential Memorandum for the NAACP Re: Refusal of Insurance Companies to Accept
Applications for Automobile Risks When Cars are Owned by Negroes (May 27, 1941) (reproduced from
the Collections of the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).
259
Letter from Roger Baldwin, American Civil Liberties Union, to Thurgood Marshall (Apr. 18, 1940)
(from NAACP files, reproduced from the Collections of the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress)
(enclosing a clipping entitled “Why the Color Line in Automobile Insurance?” (quoting the St. Louis PostDispatch as reporting that “the attitude of insurance companies generally is that Negroes are not good risks
for public liability and property damage insurance”) and containing a hand-written note at the bottom of the
clipping stating, “[h]ere’s a topic you folks might look into”).
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because I am a Negro.”260 In many cases, the insurance companies relied on facially
neutral underwriting factors to explain the denial of coverage, rather than explicit racebased classifications.261 Although in Marshall’s view, the problem was growing rather
than diminishing, it was “practically impossible to work out a court case because the
insurance is usually refused on some technical ground.”262
¶78
About a decade later, however, a case involving an explicit race-based denial of
life insurance coverage came to the NAACP’s attention.263 In the late 1940s, a
Wisconsin resident named James Rancher, a student who worked at a shoe repair shop,
applied for $1,000 of ordinary life insurance264 under the State of Wisconsin’s life
insurance fund.265 The state’s life insurance fund had been established in 1911 in
response to certain problems identified with industrial insurance.266
¶79
The state’s application form asked for Rancher’s nationality and race, which he
completed as “American Negro.”267 Although legislation forbidding life insurance
companies to engage in rate or other discrimination between blacks and whites had been
260

Letter from Thurgood Marshall, Special Counsel, to Roger Baldwin, American Civil Liberties Union
(Apr. 19, 1940) (from NAACP files, reproduced from the Collections of the Manuscript Division, Library
of Congress) (thanking Baldwin for a clipping from the St. Louis Post-Dispatch of April 15, 1940, and
explaining that it “is a difficult problem to handle,” and that “we expect a conference for some time in the
near future with State officials and the leading Insurance companies on the question”); Letter from Louis
Pink, Superintendent of Insurance, State of New York, to Walter White of the NAACP (Oct. 8, 1941) (from
NAACP files, reproduced from the Collections of the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress) (inviting
White to a conference to discuss the problem that “colored people often find it difficult to procure life and
health and accident insurance and that there is discrimination against them”). See also Memorandum from
Herbert Hill to Robert Carter (Aug. 2, 1954) (from NAACP files, reproduced from the Collections of the
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress) (requesting advice for the Jewish Labor Committee from the
NAACP Legal Department as to the “possibilities of some action regarding this matter,” and referring to an
attached “application form distributed by The Commercial Travelers Mutual Accident Association which
contains a box requesting a ‘color’ designation”).
261
Sometimes the policies were more explicit. Historian John Hope Franklin, in his recently published
autobiography, recounts a conversation he had in 1957 with his life insurance agent about the company’s
loan program to help policyholders who sought assistance in purchasing a home. The agent explained that
the company could not lend him the money because the loan would mean that “he would have helped
Negroes ‘jump’ over the line into a ‘white’ neighborhood. His company’s standing rule was never to
directly facilitate such a jump. I promptly informed him that I was canceling my insurance with him, and if
I needed any in the future I would seek it with a company that had the courage to loan me the money to
purchase a home where my family wished to live and not where the insurance company wished us to live.”
JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, MIRROR TO AMERICA: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN 177–79
(2005). I am grateful to Professor Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham for bringing Franklin’s home loan
experience to my attention.
262
Letter from Thurgood Marshall, Special Counsel, to Roger Baldwin, American Civil Liberties Union
(Apr. 19, 1940) (from NAACP files, reproduced from the Collections of the Manuscript Division, Library
of Congress).
263
See NAACP, Discrimination Insurance Companies 1940–1954 (reproduced from the Collections of the
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).
264
Trial Record at Exhibit 14, Jimmie Rancher’s Application for Insurance, Lange v. Rancher, 56 N.W.2d
542 (Wis. 1953) (No. 2).
265
See Appellant’s Brief at Statement of Facts 3, Lange v. Rancher, 56 N.W.2d 542 (Wis. 1953) (No. 2).
The state life fund had been established “to be administered by the state without liability on the part of the
state, beyond the amount of the fund, for the purpose of granting life insurance . . . and annuities” to
residents and others within the state. Id. at 7 (quoting from WIS. STAT. § 210.05).
266
The fund was established by the state legislature in 1911, as part of a reform movement to protect poorer
policyholders from exorbitant insurance premiums and other abusive practices of the insurance industry.
See MCGILL, supra note 153, at 811.
267
Appellant’s Brief, supra note 265, at 7.
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introduced in Wisconsin several times during the 1930s, those bills were not enacted into
law.268
¶80
Rancher’s application was rejected by the state insurance commissioner in 1949,
on the ground that all Negroes and other non-Caucasian races were “substandard”
insurance risks, and thus ineligible for coverage.269 In making that determination, the
commissioner relied on the greater mortality experience of insured blacks, which in 1940,
was approximately 150% of the mortality among insured whites.270 In addition, the
commissioner maintained that under the governing statute, he was not authorized to issue
policies at rates other than those based on the American Experience Table of Mortality,271
except for those in hazardous occupations.272 The commissioner therefore rejected all
non-white applications.273
¶81
Rancher challenged the denial of coverage in federal court, and when the state
insurance commissioner sought a declaratory judgment in state court regarding his
interpretation of the governing statute, Rancher filed a counterclaim.274 The state trial
court held that the rejection of his application on the basis of race constituted a proper
interpretation of the statute, and that the statute did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause under either the state or federal constitution.275
¶82
The trial court found as a factual matter that the commissioner’s classification of
blacks as substandard risks was based on the substantially higher mortality rate among
blacks than among whites.276 Although extensive testimony was received at trial tending
to show that higher mortality rate of blacks as a group was due to environmental rather
than physical differences,277 the trial court found that evidence to be inconclusive.278
268

See SPENCER L. KIMBALL, INSURANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY: A STUDY IN THE LEGAL IMPLEMENTATION
OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PUBLIC POLICY, BASED ON WISCONSIN RECORDS 1835–1959, at 126 (1960).

Similarly, according to Kimball, bills were introduced in 1951 and 1953 to forbid the state life fund to
discriminate on the basis of race, but were not enacted. Id. Discrimination on the basis of race in auto
insurance, however, had been banned by the state legislature since the early 1930s. Act of Mar. 26, 1931,
ch. 21, 1931 Wis. Sess. Laws 20 (providing that “any person who . . . shall refuse to sell or furnish any type
of automobile insurance or charge a higher rate for such insurance because of race or color, shall be liable
to the person aggrieved thereby in damages”).
269
Appellant’s Brief, supra note 265, Statement of Facts at 3. See also Trial Record at Exhibit 11, Letter
from John Lange, Commissioner of Insurance, to Jimmie Rancher, plaintiff, dated April 21, 1949, Lange v.
Rancher, 56 N.W.2d 542 (Wis. 1953) (No. 2) (informing Rancher that he was a substandard risk because he
was not Caucasian).
270
Respondent’s Brief at 8–9, Lange v. Rancher, 56 N.W.2d 542 (Wis. 1953) (No. 2) (summarizing the
trial court’s findings).
271
According to the briefs filed before the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the statutory provisions establishing
the state life fund and specifying premiums based on the American Experience Table of Mortality were
enacted by the state legislature in 1911 as part of a reform movement to protect poorer policyholders from
exorbitant insurance premiums and other abusive practices of the insurance industry. Respondent’s Brief,
supra note 270, Argument at 25; Appellant’s Brief, supra note 265, at Argument at 26–28. As described
by the appellant’s brief, the American Experience Table of Mortality was authorized, and sometimes
required, by a number of states to set premiums for life insurance sold between approximately 1902 and
1948, when it was replaced in many states by the Commissioners Standard Ordinary Mortality Table.
Appellant’s Brief, supra note 265, Argument at 24–25.
272
Respondent’s Brief, supra note 270, Argument at 13–14.
273
Id.
274
Appellant’s Brief, supra note 265, Statement of Facts at 3–4.
275
Id. at 4.
276
Respondent’s Brief, supra note 270, Questions Presented at 3.
277
The trial record in Rancher contains testimony that the variations in group mortality rates between
whites and blacks are related to environmental factors, not biology. This testimony includes statements
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Although the evidence also showed that a few insurance companies granted life insurance
to blacks upon the same basis as whites,279 the trial court found that most large private
companies had not accepted classifying risks without regard to race. Life insurance
companies would generally differentiate between blacks and whites by charging a higher
premium for insuring blacks, or allowing a lesser commission to agents for selling
insurance to blacks, or limiting the solicitation of blacks.280 The trial court viewed the
classification as reasonable and germane to state statutory requirements, which did not
permit the commissioner to insure blacks at premiums in excess of the standard premium
rates.281
¶83
On appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Lange v. Rancher,282 reversed the
trial court ruling and held that that the insurance commissioner had “failed to show that
the racial classification [was] the only one which will achieve the purposes for which the
State Life Fund was created.”283 The court required the commissioner to use a raceneutral classification, unless he could show that race itself was a decisive factor in the
unfavorable mortality experience.
¶84
Unlike the trial court, the Wisconsin Supreme Court did not view the practices of
private insurance companies to be controlling and emphasized that the case involved an
individual applicant, not a group.284 There was evidence in the record that some blacks
“whose applications [were] properly screened and evaluated would have a mortality
equal to that of white persons.”285 The court concluded that the summary rejection of
Rancher’s application without investigation or evaluation, under standards applied to
white applicants, did not comply with the provisions of the statute.286
¶85
Because the statute itself, properly construed, required equal treatment of black
and white insurance applicants, the court did not base its conclusion on equal protection
grounds under the federal or state constitutions.287 In addition, because the case dealt
only with the state-sponsored insurance fund, the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s 1953
from professors of Anthropology, Zoology, and Genetics at the University of Wisconsin, a Professor of
Anthropology at the University of Chicago, and the Assistant Director of the Chicago Community
Inventory, who had researched mortality rates in Chicago.
278
Lange v. Rancher, 56 N.W. 2d 542, 547 (Wis. 1953) (dissenting opinion); see also Respondent’s Brief,
supra note 270, Statement of Facts at 5.
279
Rancher, 56 N.W. 2d at 544. Examples of private companies with race-neutral policies included the
Mutual Life Insurance of New York, TIAA-CREF, which sold insurance policies to professors, and the
CUNA Mutual Insurance Company, which sold insurance to members of credit unions. In addition, the
record includes other insurance organizations that did not differentiate in rates or benefits on the basis of
race, including policies sold by the government to members of the armed forces in World Wars I and II.
Respondent's Brief, supra note 270, Argument at 24; see also Trial Record at Exhibit 23, Letter from R.D.
Peck, Director, Veterans Administration, to William Gold, attorney, dated March 3, 1950, Lange v.
Rancher, 56 N.W.2d 542 (Wis. 1953) (No. 2) (explaining that none of the data used in obtaining mortality
rates under either the United States Government Life Insurance or National Service Life Insurance are
subdivided by race or color of the insured).
280
Rancher, 56 N.W. 2d at 543-44 (majority opinion), 547 (dissenting opinion); Respondent’s Brief, supra
note 270, Statement of Facts at 6–7.
281
Rancher, 56 N.W. 2d at 545-47 (dissenting opinion); Respondent’s Brief, supra note 270, Questions
Presented at 4.
282
56 N.W.2d 542 (Wis. 1953).
283
56 N.W.2d at 544.
284
Id.
285
Id.
286
Id.
287
Id.
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decision in Lange v. Rancher did not reach the race-based practices of private
commercial insurance companies.
¶86
However, by the early 1950s, private insurance companies began modifying their
race-based ordinary insurance practices. For example, in 1951, Metropolitan authorized
its agents to solicit African-American business in New York, subject to the same rules on
commissions that applied to white lives.288 By the end of 1954, it had eliminated most of
its rules on race-based commissions,289 and by 1958, with the possible exception of
agents operating under old renewal agreements, all race-based practices with regard to
dual commissions had ceased.290 Nevertheless, at least through the mid-1960s, the
company engaged in other race-based practices, including collecting information about
the race of insurance applicants, imposing different policy limits and medical
examination requirements on black applicants, and applying different financial reporting
standards for non-white applicants or for white applicants in interracial marriages.291
E. The Discrediting of Scientific Racism after World War II
When Myrdal conducted his influential survey of race relations in America,292
prominent individual American scientists, including anthropologist Franz Boas and
several of his former students, had for several decades been challenging the biological
understanding of race in various scientific circles.293 In the 1930s and early 1940s, Boas
and his associates began organizing and writing statements aimed at the general public
against the “scientific” racism of the Nazi regime.294
¶88
The broader scientific community also began to take a public position against the
Nazi regime’s racial theories in anti-racist declarations. In December 1938, an anti-racist
Scientists’ Manifesto was released at a news conference with over twelve hundred
signatures, including three Nobel laureates and sixty-four members of the National
Academy of Scientists.295 In addition to statements signed by individual scientists,
American academic organizations and scientific societies began issuing anti-racist
statements in 1938. These included the American Association of University Professors,
which protested against totalitarian persecution of teachers “on account of their race,
religion, or political ideas,”296 the American Anthropological Association, which

¶87

288

See NYS INS. DEPT., REPORT ON METROPOLITAN LIFE, supra note 160, at 22–23.
Id.
290
Id. at 23.
291
Id. at 18–20, 24. In addition, see the description of Metropolitan’s policies, adopted in the late 1940s
and early 1950s, which discouraged the sale of standard ordinary policies to black customers, including
“occupational” and “area” underwriting, mercantile reports, and controls on the volume and quality of
policies held by African-American policyholders in Thompson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 149 F. Supp.
2d 38, 43–47 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
292
See discussion supra at the beginning of Part III.
293
E.g., BARKAN, supra note 18, at 66–134 (discussing the work of Franz Boas and his associates).
294
See, e.g., RUTH BENEDICT, RACE AND RACISM viii (1942) (describing racism as “a travesty” of scientific
knowledge); RUTH BENEDICT, RACE: SCIENCE AND POLITICS 151–218 (1940).
295
BARKAN, supra note 18, at 337.
296
Id. at 338–39. The texts of the resolutions are reproduced in BENEDICT, RACE AND RACISM, supra note
294, at 166–71 (including resolutions by the American Association of University Professors from
December 28, 1938, the American Anthropological Association from December 1938, the Executive
Council of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues, Annual Meeting of the American
Psychological Association, December 1938, and the Manifesto from the Seventh International Genetics
Congress at Edinburgh, August 28–30, 1939).
289
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approved a resolution against Nazi classification of race, and the Society for the
Psychological Study of Social Issues.297 The repudiation of scientific racism continued
into 1939 when a group of leading geneticists at the International Congress of Genetics
issued an anti-racist Geneticists’ Manifesto,298 and culminated in the 1950 U.N.
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) declaration on “The Race
Question.”299 Representing the “most modern views of biologists, geneticists,
psychologists, sociologists, and anthropologists,”300 the UNESCO statement declared: (1)
that the mental capacities of all races are similar; (2) that no evidence for biological
deterioration as a result of racial mixing or hybridization existed; (3) that “genetic
differences are not of importance in determining the social and cultural differences”
between groups of people; and (4) that for all practical social purposes, “race is not so
much a biological phenomenon as a social myth.”301
¶89
Fifteen years earlier, as explained in the introduction to UNESCO’s statement on
race, the European scientific community had failed to issue a definitive statement on the
race question at a conference organized by the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, a project that it “had to abandon in deference to the appeasement policy of the
pre-War period.”302 As noted by Elazar Barkan in his study of the refutation of scientific
foundations for racism, the UNESCO statement illustrates the major shift that occurred
between the two world wars, when biological explanations of race were largely replaced
by cultural or environmental analysis.303
¶90
When scientists rejected the notion of innate or “natural” racial traits, the original
rationale for race-distinct pricing in insurance was undermined. If race-classified
mortality differentials were largely related to the social, economic, and environmental
conditions experienced by black Americans—conditions that were then under attack by
the Civil Rights Movement as closely tied to the Jim Crow system of legalized racial
separation and subordination—then pricing differentials based on the race of individual
policyholders could no longer be justified or sustained by the industry.
¶91
As discussed above,304 in the early 1960s, race-merged industrial mortality tables
were developed with the assistance of private industry actuaries305 and approved by
297

BARKAN, supra note 18, at 338–39; see also BENEDICT, SCIENCE AND POLITICS, supra note 294, at 166
(reproducing the resolution, which decried distortion of anthropological data “to serve the cause of an
unscientific racialism” rather than “the cause of truth”).
298
BARKAN, supra note 18, at 280–81.
299
U.N. EDUC., SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORG. (UNESCO), THE RACE QUESTION, UNESCO Pub. No.
791 (July 18, 1950) [hereinafter THE RACE QUESTION] (originally drafted by Ashley Montagu, Claude
Levi-Strauss, and six other scientists from various countries, and revised by Montagu after criticism
submitted by Hadley Cantril, E.G. Conklin, Gunnar Dahlberg, Theodosius Dobzhansky, L. C. Dunn,
Donald Hager, Julian S. Huxley, Otto Klineberg, Wilbert Moore, H. J. Muller, Gunnar Myrdal, Joseph
Needham, and Curt Stern).
300
BARKAN, supra note 18, at 341; see also No Scientific Basis for Race Bias Found by World Panel of
Experts, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1950, at 1 (cited and quoted by Barkan in his Epilogue).
301
THE RACE QUESTION, supra note 299, at 8–9.; see also U.N. EDUC., SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORG.
(UNESCO), THE RACE CONCEPT: RESULTS OF AN INQUIRY, U.N. Sales No. SS.52.II.9.A (1952).
302
THE RACE QUESTION, supra note 299, Introduction at 2.
303
BARKAN, supra note 18, at 342.
304
See discussion supra Part III.B.
305
Brown, supra note 167, at 457 (The Superintendent of Insurance for the State of New York, chair of the
Industrial Table Study Subcommittee of the Life Insurance Committee of the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners, appointed an Industry Advisory Committee of company actuaries to work with
the technicians of the insurance departments to develop a modern mortality table to replace the 1941
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industry regulators to replace the racially identified “standard” and “substandard”
mortality tables first adopted in 1907, and later revised in 1941. The influence of
professional societies of actuaries in this process under the supervision of the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners permitted change on an industry-wide basis.
These changes brought the industry more in line with prevailing scientific views. In
addition, the industry’s rejection of race-based practices and the adoption of race-merged
tables showed growing responsiveness to civil rights concerns.
¶92
In sum, the development of a standard race-integrated or race-merged table
followed in the decade after a consensus developed within the politically involved
scientific community that racial difference reflected cultural rather than biological
difference. The consensus of important figures in the scientific community, which could
not be achieved in the mid-1930s given the political context in pre-war Europe, was
finally reached following World War II. Because of the role of industry groups within
the profession of actuarial science, prospective change could be made on a broad
industry-wide basis. Although insurance companies would continue to factor mortality
experience of their policyholders into their overall cost analysis, the biggest
“mainstream” companies no longer used race-distinct mortality tables to maintain dualrate pricing structures.
IV. CONCLUSION
¶93

As Oliver Wendell Holmes observed in The Path of the Law, published shortly
after the United States Supreme Court decided Plessy v. Ferguson, “[w]e do not realize
how large a part of our law is open to reconsideration upon a slight change in the habit of
the public mind.”306 A similar dynamic applies to reconsideration of private commercial
practice.
¶94
Race-based insurance practices both mirrored and reinforced the racial
assumptions and hierarchies of the surrounding political, scientific, economic, and social
culture of the times.307 Reflecting “the habit of the public mind,” they proved highly
resistant to change until the underlying racial assumptions were challenged by the
transformative event of World War II and by the post-war Civil Rights Movement.308
¶95
Like Jim Crow state-sanctioned race segregation, which prevented “an enforced
co-mingling of the two races,”309 the insurance industry justified and enforced Jim Crow
race-based practices by reference to inherent or natural racial differences.310 After
Reconstruction, life insurance companies began insuring emancipated slaves at two-thirds
the benefits provided to white policyholders.311 Although the values echoed slavery era
racial hierarchies, the companies explained the change by reference to the “excessive
Commissioners Standard Industrial Mortality Table.). Information was collected from all industrial
companies with at least $50 million of outstanding life insurance in force in 1958, including data on the
proportions of non-white and female business. Id. at 457. See discussion supra Part III.B.4.
306
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 466 (1897).
307
See discussion supra Part III.B.3.
308
See discussion supra Part III.B.4, III.D–E.
309
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
310
Id. (observing also that legislation is “powerless to eradicate racial instincts or to abolish distinctions
based on physical differences”); see HOFFMAN, RACE TRAITS, supra note 137, at v (describing the
“longevity and physiological peculiarities among the colored population”).
311
See discussion supra Part III.B.1.

397

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY

¶96

¶97

¶98

¶99

¶100

[2009

mortality” and “innate” racial traits of former slaves. Race-categorized mortality
differentials quantified those differences and classified policyholders as “standard” and
“substandard” risks. Race-based pricing structures thus underscored the dominant
ideological assumptions about racial superiority and inferiority.312
By contrast, where observable mortality differentials did not reinforce background
status hierarchies, they tended to be disregarded for pricing purposes. For example, the
industry’s mortality experience in the late nineteenth century and beginning of the
twentieth century showed mortality differentials among industrial policyholder groups
classified by gender that approached, and at certain ages exceeded, the differentials
observed in groups categorized by race. Although males on average experienced greater
mortality than females, the industry maintained sex-merged mortality tables and genderneutral pricing in those markets.313 Thus, the industrial companies generally did not
charge males, other than black males, higher rates as “substandard” risks.
When Jim Crow segregation came under attack in the second Reconstruction
following World War II, the underlying justifications for race-based pricing were finally
discredited. The repudiation of scientific racism after the defeat of the Nazi regime led to
a fundamental rethinking of race. Cultural and environmental understandings replaced
“natural” and “biological” explanations of race. When the Civil Rights Movement
successfully attacked Jim Crow for its role in creating and maintaining unequal social and
environmental conditions, the insurance industry could no longer sustain higher rates or
coverage restrictions for black Americans based on “substandard” mortality categorized
by race.
Beginning in the late 1940s, a leading industrial life insurance company, under
increasing pressure from the Civil Rights Movement, began equalizing rates despite
continuing race-correlated mortality differentials. Later, the industry achieved a form of
collective action in the early 1960s, with the development of race-integrated tables by
industry professional groups, approved for state regulatory purposes by the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners. Thus, by the time the Civil Rights Movement
achieved landmark legal and legislative reforms in the mid-1960s, the life insurance
industry had adopted a race-integrated mortality table and the leading companies had
voluntarily discontinued explicit race-based pricing practices for newly issued policies.
Shortly thereafter, the former “Big Three” industrial companies (Prudential,
Metropolitan, and John Hancock) withdrew from the industrial insurance market by
discontinuing the sale of new industrial policies. They left that business to smaller or
historically black companies operating primarily in southern markets. The bigger
companies aimed their future marketing efforts at the more prosperous middle class,
including black policyholders who could afford ordinary life insurance.
Earlier state legislative efforts to eliminate explicit race-based pricing had been
largely ineffective in accomplishing lasting reform. Beginning in the late nineteenth
312

See discussion supra Part III.B.3.
See discussion supra Part III.B.3. The story of race-based insurance practices thus provides important
context for understanding the development of gender-based rates, which today are commonly encountered
in private commercial life insurance and annuities. The range of life insurance products and characteristics
of the markets where gender-based rates developed requires a more thorough investigation of practices in
life insurance and annuity markets aimed at the middle class. However, any such study should consider
sex-neutral pricing practices in the working class insurance markets where race-based practices first
developed.
313
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century, several Northern states passed laws prohibiting differentials in life insurance
premiums or benefits solely on the basis of race. These state laws rejected race as a
classification category. Although individuals could be classified on some other basis
such as health or habits, they could not be placed in a lesser rating category solely on the
basis of race.314
¶101
Some companies responded by adopting other types of less visible practices to
limit their risk, such as more stringent medical examinations or credit checks for all black
applicants. Others pulled their business from those states or thereafter declined to solicit
black business anywhere.315 The resulting market segmentation led to racial segregation
of insurance markets and the development of black-owned insurance companies,
mirroring patterns of race separation, subordination, and segregation found more
generally in America during the Jim Crow era.316 Not until the end of the twentieth
century did many of the smaller companies change their dual rate practices; some did not
eliminate them until faced with state insurance department investigations or lawsuits by
black policyholders.317
¶102
In conclusion, as history shows, given the structure and regulation of life
insurance markets, lasting reform could not be accomplished state-by-state or market-bymarket. Change came from a form of collective action by life insurance industry
professional groups, which was achieved only after a fundamental rethinking of race, a
“change in the habit of the public mind” that led to reconsideration of long-established
commercial practice.
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See discussion supra Part III.B.2.
Id.
316
See discussion supra Part III.C.
317
See discussion supra Part III.B.4 (discussing civil rights cases brought under Civil War-era federal
statutes).
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